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ABSTRACT

The first essay investigates the relationship between diversification strategy and
firm performance in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. Prior literature has
evaluated the effect of total diversification on insurer performance; however, there is an
absence of evidence on the effect of diversification strategy for multi-line insurers. Theory
suggests that related diversifiers should benefit from economies of scope while unrelated
diversifiers should benefit from uncorrelated earnings streams. We test for the net effect of
diversification strategy and find that relatedness negatively impacts accounting
performance. However, we find that the relatedness penalty is confined to stock insurers
while mutual insurers’ profitability appears to be unaffected by diversification strategy.
Our article is the first to document the strategy-performance effect within U.S. property
liability insurers.

The second essay measures the impact government enforcement actions have on
investor confidence by examining changes in market quality in the firms investigated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission for fraud. The market quality measures we test
include returns, price volatility, spreads, and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure. We find
that returns improve and price volatility reduces during an SEC investigation. However,
spreads widen and illiquidity significantly increases after controlling for the known
ii

determinants of liquidity. Our work highlights some of the benefits and costs of having an
active regulator of the US securities market.

This article investigates the source of the diversification discount commonly found
in the literature pertaining to corporate diversification (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Prior
studies have had difficulty identifying the source of the discount due to data limitations
from traditional sources. We use a sample of U.S. property casualty insurers with
performance data (loss ratio) available at the segment-level, we are able to track the
performance of existing segments before and after the firm acquires a new business line.
This allows us to determine whether the discount is due to the underperformance of the
newly acquired segments and/or if the addition of a new line actually affects the
performance of the existing lines. We find evidence that diversifying firms underperform in
the three years before the diversification event, and that the performance disparity
between diversifying and non-diversifying firms dramatically widens in the postdiversification period. We document that the existing business segment’s loss ratios
increase by 5.4% (worsens) in the year the firm diversifies, and remains consistently
higher for the next 3 years. We also find that the new lines significantly outperform the
existing business lines by an average margin of 6% in the post-diversification period. Our
multivariate tests confirm these results. Therefore, we trace the source of the
diversification discount to the declining performance in the existing business segments
iii

following the addition of a new line, supporting the notion that corporate diversification
destroys value.
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ESSAY 1: THE EFFECTS OF DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
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1.1 Introduction
Prior literature has defined a diversified insurer as one that has moved from being a
one-product insurer (auto, homeowners, life) to a multi-product insurer. The extant
literature has focused on explaining the performance differences between focused and
diversified insurers (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008; Elango, et al., 2008; Cummins et al.,
2010). What has been largely ignored is the performance variations within diversified
insurers. The goal of our research is to fill this gap by examining how an insurer’s portfolio
of business lines, or diversification strategy, affects accounting performance. This is of
particular importance given the relation between a firm’s diversification strategy and firm
value (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991; Berger and Ofek 1995; Fan and Lang 2000).
Diversification strategy represents the degree to which a firm participates among
related or unrelated products and/or business segments. Two business lines or products
are considered to be related if they have similar production characteristics. For instance,
auto insurance and homeowners insurance are very similar in several aspects such as
clientele, marketing channels, and underwriting processes. On the other hand, product
liability insurance and earthquake insurance do not share as many similar production
characteristics. There has been much written on the advantages and disadvantages of
related versus unrelated diversification (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992; Palich et al., 2000).
The advantages of related diversification have been argued to arise from the ability of firms
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to exploit economies of scope (Teece, 1982). “[E]conomies of scope simply means that for
two outputs, X1 and X2, the value created by their joint production is greater than the value
created if they are produced separately (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992: 502).” However,
inefficient resource sharing, resource overstretching, and over utilized management
(congestion) could lead to increased costs in a related diversification strategy (Teece, 1982;
Porter, 1987). The advantages of unrelated diversification have been argued to stem from
two sources, efficient internal governance economies (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and
imperfectly correlated income streams (Barney, 1997). The efficient internal governance
argument implies that top management can address division-level inefficiencies, terminate
underperforming managers, and better allocate capital than can outside investors. In this
respect the individual divisions can run more efficiently than comparable single-division
firms (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). Imperfectly correlated income streams may also
help reduce insurer risk, improve risk pooling, and reduce the negative effects the business
cycle may have on primary income sources. The main contribution of our paper is to
distinguish which set of economic benefits equate with better performance that, to the best
of our knowledge, has yet to be examined within the U.S. property-liability insurance
industry.
This article investigates the relationship between diversification strategy and financial
performance to test which strategy, related strategy (synergistic gains) or unrelated
strategy (efficient governance and uncorrelated income streams), is associated with better
performance. We quantify diversification strategy using a new measure of line-of-business
relatedness introduced by Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer (2012, BLRS
2012 hereafter). We then analyze how well this measure explains the variation in ROA
2

among U.S. property-liability insurers controlling for other determinants of profitability
and possible endogenous choice of diversification strategy. The empirical tests indicate
that insurers employing an unrelated diversification strategy exhibit stronger accounting
performance than insurers employing a more related diversification strategy. This finding
is confirmed in both univariate and multivariate tests. Although our tests confirm that the
average firm benefits from an unrelated strategy, this finding is not universal across all
firm types. Specifically, diversification strategy appears to affect stock insurer performance,
while mutual insurer’s performance did not exhibit any significant relationship with
diversification strategy. Furthermore, our primary finding is robust to firms changing
diversification strategy and an alternate measure of relatedness. Our paper offers the first
evidence that, among U.S. insurers, firms who employ a more unrelated strategy experience
higher profitability than firms employing a more related strategy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we discuss the relevant
literature as it relates to diversification, diversification strategy, and insurer financial
performance. Next we present our hypotheses as well as discuss the methodology and
variables employed in the study. Empirical results follow, and then we conclude.

3

1.2 Prior Literature

Diversification-performance relationship
Financial economists have been studying the implications of diversification and
diversification strategy for many years. Lang and Stultz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995;
1999) initially provided strong evidence that the market discounts firms operating in
multiple industrial segments. However, researchers have recently posited that the finding
of a diversification discount may be the result of irregularities in segment-level data and
that diversification may actually lead to a diversification premium (Villalonga 2004).
Furthermore, Hyland and Diltz (2002) and Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that a priori firm
characteristics, namely low growth opportunity and excess cash reserves, account for the
diversification discount identified in Berger and Ofek (1995). More recently, Santalo and
Becerra (2008) find that the performance-diversification relationship was not
homogeneous across industries, but that diversification was associated with positive
performance in industries dominated by diversified firms, and negative in industries
dominated by single segment firms.
The diversification literature related to property-liability (P/L) insurers appears to
be more unified in its assessment of a negative diversification-performance relationship
than the general finance literature. Hoyt and Trieschmann (1991) report that while both
specialized and diversified firms outperform market benchmarks, specialized firms
outperformed diversified firms from 1973 to 1987. Tombs and Hoyt (1994) also report
4

higher risk-adjusted returns for specialized insurers’ equities. More recently, Liebenberg
and Sommer (2008) provide evidence of a performance penalty and market discount
among diversified P/L insurers. Elango, Ma, and Pope (2008) also identify a diversificationperformance penalty, but noted that this relationship was nonlinear in nature. Cummins et
al. (2010) find that more focused firms are more efficient than diversified firms using data
envelopment analysis. Shim’s (2011) empirical results also suggests a performance
disparity in product-diversified firms, with more focused insurers outperforming productdiversified insurers. Taken together, the diversification literature that has focused
explicitly on the insurance industry generally finds that diversification has a negative
impact on firm performance.

Diversification strategy-performance relationship
There is ample literature on the effects of diversification on insurer performance;
yet to date little research exists on the performance implications of diversification strategy
within the P/L insurance industry. To the best of our knowledge, Li and Greenwood (2004)
is the only other study that empirically tests relatedness and performance in an insurance
setting. Using a sample of 276 diversified Canadian insurers, Li and Greenwood found the
extent of diversification to be an insignificant predictor of firm performance, but that
market niche relatedness to be positively associated with performance. Berger and Ofek
(1995) found that the value loss from conglomerate diversification was mitigated by high
levels of relatedness. Berger and Ofek explain that the additional loss in value among
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unrelated diversifiers may be due to overinvestment, consistent with Jensen (1986) and
Stulz (1990).
Firms that choose to diversify can select a strategy of related diversification or
unrelated diversification. Prior literature suggests that firms will select related
diversification when the costs of producing separate outputs exceed the costs of joint
production (i.e., economies of scope). For insurers, the benefits gained through economies
of scope can be achieved by employing a senior management team to make business
decisions across multiple segments, by taking advantage of existing marketing channels
(e.g. multi-policy sales and distribution), taking advantage of multi-loss adjustors, by
combining underwriting and claims services, transferring brand name and reputation
across products/services, or exploiting closely related technologies (underwriting or
actuarial). Alternatively, insurers may select a strategy of unrelated diversification which
may provide some unique advantages of its own derived primarily from financial synergies
and greater risk reduction (Amit and Livant 1988a; Barney 1997). Portfolio theory
suggests that overall risk can be reduced with a collection of assets with imperfectly
correlated values. In an insurance setting, having uncorrelated premium and claim flows
can improve qualities of risk pooling and stabilize profits during business cycle slumps. For
example, an insurer can exploit unrelated diversification when a business line is subject to
market contractions by allocating human resources and capital to business lines that may
be unaffected by the contraction. In many cases, firms diversify by means of acquisition
rather than product creation. A related strategy would look to acquire firms that
strategically fit within their existing book of business, where an unrelated strategy would
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look to acquire undervalued firms, perhaps financially distressed with promising prospects
irrespective of strategic fit or value chain enhancements.
While prior literature has recognized that firms may select different diversification
strategies, research on the costs and benefits of these strategies is far from conclusive.
Numerous studies have found support for the superiority of related diversification over
unrelated diversification (Rumelt 1974, 1982; Christensen and Montgomery 1981; Palepu
1985; Bae, Kwon, and Lee 2011). While there are many explanations as to why a strategy
of relatedness improves performance, most cite the creation of synergies as a result of
efficient resource sharing (e.g., Teece 1980; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, and Winter 1994).
Although previous studies have found a positive relation between relatedness and
firm performance, other studies have reported conflicting results. Michel and Shaked’s
(1984) evidence suggests that firms diversifying in unrelated sectors are able to generate
statistically superior performance over those with business segments that are related. Fan
and Lang (2000) reported that firms with vertically related segments are, on average,
associated with lower value during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Fan and Lang use the Berger and
Ofek (1995) SIC measure of relatedness and find “strong evidence” that firm value is
negatively associated with relatedness. Based on this evidence, Fan and Lang rejected the
notion that related diversification always improves firm value. Using perceptual survey
data from top industry executives as his basis for relatedness, Pehrsson (2006) identified a
negative relationship between “high relatedness” and firm performance. Teece (1982)
suggests that when firms attempt to leverage the same resources for an increased number
of activities can lead to poorer performance due to congestion. Li and Greenwood (2004)
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posit that congestion may be higher in an intra-industry setting due to similarities across
customer groups and profit inputs.
Other studies have found no significant relationship between diversification
strategy and performance after controlling for industry characteristics, lagged
performance, or using different relatedness measures (Christensen and Montgomery 1981;
Grant, Jammine, and Thomas 1988; Hill 1983; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson 1992)

8

1.3 Hypothesis Development

Diversification Strategy Hypothesis
The most common theoretical rationale supporting the dominance of a related
diversification strategy are the benefits derived from economies of scope (Teece 1982;
Markides and Williamson 1994; Seth 1990). Related diversifiers capture advantages by
sharing inputs in the production of several similar goods. However, costs may also arise
from a related strategy. Nayyar (1992) states that for a related strategy to enhance
performance, business units must efficiently communicate and cooperate in order to
generate synergies. Bureaucratic distortions, intra-firm competition for resources,
problems allocating joint costs, or technological inadequacies may all attenuate
performance benefits of a related strategy (Palich et al. 2000).
Unrelated strategies, on the other hand, may generate their own financial synergies.
One such advantage stems from portfolio theory, where benefits can arise from
uncorrelated units of business. When we extend these benefits to an insurance setting,
uncorrelated lines of business could bring uncorrelated income streams, and uncorrelated
losses among policyholders. Insurers with uncorrelated income streams should also realize
reduced cash flow risk, reduced regulatory risk, and lower insolvency risk. Low risk
insurers can also charge higher prices, where insurers with high insolvency risk must
compensate policyholders for holding additional risk (Sommer 1996). In addition to a
9

reduction in operational risk, impacts from industry-wide shocks and catastrophic events
will have a less severe impact on a more unrelated book of business than a related book.
Therefore, with theory supporting both arguments, we offer our first hypothesis on the
diversification strategy-performance relationship in null form as follows:
H1: Diversification strategy will have no effect on the performance of diversified firms.

Organizational Form Hypothesis
Within the population of insurance firms exists several significant subgroups with
contradistinct management, capital, and organizational structures. Stock and mutual
insurers are two of these distinct groups. Differences between these groups have been the
subject of many investigations. One primary difference is that stock insurers have a
stronger mechanism to control managerial opportunism than mutual insurers (Meyers and
Smith, 1981, 1982). The market for corporate control, equity based compensation, and
shareholder monitoring all contribute to controlling agency costs and aligning managers
interests with ownership’s, however, these controls are not present in mutual insurers.
Therefore, mutual insurers should limit the operational freedom of management
(managerial discretion), where managers of stock insurers should be allowed more
discretion in pursuing possible value maximizing projects (Meyers and Smith 1982). It is
reasonable to assume that firms perusing a related diversification strategy are inherently
limiting managerial discretion via choice of similar business products whereas firms must
allow managers more operational freedom when operating with an unrelated business
strategy.
10

The empirical evidence in BLRS (2012) document a significant difference in the
diversification strategies mutual and stock insurers employ. Mutual insurers exhibit
significantly higher levels of related diversification, which requires less managerial
discretion, than stock insurers. As expected, mutual insurers actively limit managerial
scope by choosing more related business lines, where stock insurers allow managers more
operational freedom. What remains an open question is whether performance is affected
when mutual or stock insurers deviate from their recommended diversification strategy.
Hence we offer our second testable hypotheses:
H2a: Mutual insurers will benefit from a related diversification strategy.
H2b: Stock insurers will benefit from a unrelated diversification strategy.
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1.4 Data and Methodology

Sample Selection
Our initial sample includes all firms in the NAIC property-liability Infopro database
for the years 1995 through 2009. The sample period is chosen to include both ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ insurance markets, allowing for our results to not be artifacts of market conditions.
Prior to the year 2000, insurance markets were characterized by low prices and increased
supply. Tighter underwriting standards and higher prices followed until late 2005 when
markets began softening again (Insurance Information Institute, 2008)1.
The focus of our investigation is to determine the effects of diversification strategy
among P/L insurers. In order to employ a diversification “strategy”, one must first be
diversified; therefore our first screen removes insurers operating in only one line of
business. Next, we exclude firms that are under any regulatory scrutiny. We then aggregate
affiliated insurers at the group level. This aggregation controls for potential double
counting of intra-group shareholdings and accounts for the likelihood that diversification
decisions are made at the group-level (Lamm-Tennant and Starks 1993; Berger et al. 2000;
Liebenberg and Sommer 2008; BLRS 2012). We also exclude groups with substantial L/H
premium (at least 25 percent of total premiums) so as to focus on P/L insurers. Firms with

1

http://www.iii.org/
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organizational structures other than stock and mutual are also removed. Finally, we
exclude firms with fewer than the five years of historical data needed to compute our risk
variable (Grace 2004, Liebenberg and Sommer 2008).
Our final sample includes 760 unique P/L insurers, of which 317 are unique group
insurers and 443 are unique unaffiliated insurers. Our initial sample included years 1995
through 2009, however because five years of historical data are required for the calculation
of our risk variable, our sample period is limited to 2000 through 2009. We report 5,439
insurer-year observations, of which 2,448 are group-year observations and 2,991 are
unaffiliated observations.

Performance Measure Selection
Because each of the aforementioned hypotheses tests the relation between
diversification strategy and firm performance, a proxy for performance must be selected.
Of the various performance measures used in the insurance literature, the most common is
return on assets (ROA).2 However, high performance may be (in-part) attributed to the
risks associated with an insurers opportunity set; thus we follow Hamilton and Shergill
(1993), Limpaphayom (2003), Grace (2004), Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and use the
standard deviation of ROA for the past five years as a risk control in our models (SDROA5). 3

2See:

Amit and Livant (1988); Grant, Jammine, and Thomas (1988); BarNiv and McDonals (1992), Pottier and
Sommer (1999), Browne, Carson, and Hoyt (2001); Green and Segal (2004); Wang, Jeng, and Peng (2007).
3 Hamilton and Shergill (1993) and Lai and Limpaphayom (2003) also use a similar method to account for
observation-specific risk.
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Diversification Strategy Measure
Historically, financial economists have found it difficult to objectively measure
relatedness on large samples (Fan and Lang, 2000). Caves et al., (1980), Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1990), Berger and Ofek (1995) measure relatedness by counting differing two, three-, or four-digit SIC coded segments. Fan and Lang (2000) argued that the SIC
classification was not suited to measure differences between segments because they do not
reveal relatedness types and cannot hope to measure the degree to which segments are
related.4 Rumelt (1974, 1982) uses a combination of objective and subjective criteria which
can lead to measurement inconsistencies. Fortunately, U.S. insurance regulation has
afforded robust internal data which we use to capture the extent of U.S. insurers
diversification strategy.
We avoid the shortcomings of discrete measures of relatedness by using a proxy
developed by Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer (2012) that assigns a
relatedness score to each insurer based on their own book of business. Critical to the
formation of our firm relatedness measure is an industry by-line relatedness score, 𝑅𝑐𝑗 ,
that captures how each of the 24 lines of business we monitor are related to one another,
that is each line 𝑐 with each line 𝑗. 𝑅𝑐𝑗 is the result of applying the Bryce and Winter (2009)
relatedness index approach to the P/L insurance industry, it is interpreted as the percentile
rank score that identifies where each pair of business lines lie in the distribution of all pairs

Montgomery (1982), Davis and Duhaime (1989), Nayyar (1992), Villalonga (2004) also note limitations
using SIC classifications.
4
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of business lines. For example, a 𝑅𝑐𝑗 score of .94 for two particular lines implies that 94
percent all other combination of lines are less related and 6 percent are more related. The
process to calculate each inter-line relatedness score begins by counting the number of
insurers writing in each pair of business lines while adjusting for random paring due to
managerial experimentation (Teece et al., 1994):

𝜏𝑐𝑗 =

𝐽𝑐𝑗 − 𝜇𝑐𝑗
,
𝜎𝑐𝑗

(1)

where
𝜇𝑐𝑗 =

𝑛𝑐 𝑛𝑗
,
𝐾

(2)

and
2
𝜎𝑐𝑗
= 𝜇𝑐𝑗 (1 −

𝑛𝑐 𝐾 − 𝑛𝑗
)(
).
𝐾 𝐾−1

(3)

𝐽𝑐𝑗 denotes the number of insurers writing both lines 𝑐 and 𝑗, 𝑛𝑐 is the number of insures
writing in 𝑐, and 𝐾 denotes the total number of insurers. Next the relatedness measure, 𝜏𝑐𝑗 ,
is adjusted for economic importance. This process involves converting the output of
equation 1 to a weighted distance matrix Λ, where each cell represents each 𝜏𝑐𝑗 distance
from maximum 𝜏 weighted by the average of insurers’ premiums written that are
attributable to a specific (𝑐 and 𝑗) combination of business lines:

Λ 𝑐𝑗 = {

max(𝜏) − 𝜏𝑐𝑗 
},
𝑆𝑐𝑗

and
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(4)

𝑆𝑐𝑗 =

∑𝑖 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖 (𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑐 , 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑗 )𝐼𝑐𝑗𝑖
.
∑𝑖 𝐼𝑐𝑗𝑖

(5)

Where 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑘 is equal to 1 if insurer 𝑖 writes both business lines 𝑐 and𝑗, and 0 otherwise.
𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖 denotes total net premiums written in line 𝑐.
The next step is to solve a shortest path algorithm to estimate the relatedness of
business line combinations not observed in the sample. Afterwards, the newly formed
shortest path matrix is converted to a similarities matrix by subtracting all cells from the
maximum distance score in the previous step. Finally, the similarities matrix scores are
transformed into percentile relatedness ranks, or our by-line relatedness score 𝑅𝑐𝑗 . We
then calculate each insurer’s relatedness score computing how each insurer-line is related
to its remaining book of business. The weighted-average relatedness scores for each line of
business is calculated as:

𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 =

∑𝑗≠𝑐 𝑅 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑐𝑗

∑𝑗≠𝑐 𝑁𝑃𝑊

(6)

𝑖𝑗𝑡

Where 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the weighted-average relatedness score of line c for insurer i at
time t. 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the net premiums written for each insurer 𝑖 in line 𝑗 in year 𝑡.
Aggregate relatedness scores are then multiplied by the net premiums written for that line,
and scaled by total net premiums written, resulting in a final relatedness score for each
insurer-year, 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 :
𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =

∑𝑐 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑐𝑡 × 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡
∑𝑐 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑐𝑡
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(7)

The resulting score increases as insurers’ write in more related lines and decreases as
premiums are spread across more unrelated lines of business.

Diversification extent. Our study uses a sample of firms with varying degrees of
diversification. While our focus is on the performance effects of diversification strategy, it is
important to control for the degree to which an insurer is diversified. We follow the
standard approach used in BLRS (2012) and measure total diversification using a
Herfindahl index of net premiums written across 24 separate lines of business (LOBHERF).
We define LOBHERF for firm i in year t as:
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𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 2
𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (
)
𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡

(8)

𝑗=1

where 𝑁𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑡 is firm i’s net premiums written in line j in year t.5A LOBHERF close to zero
would indicate a relatively diversified firm where a value closer to one would indicate a
more concentrated firm.

We follow the line of business convention as established by BLRS (2012). We use the Underwriting and
Investment Exhibit (Part 1B – Premiums Written) of an insurers’ annual statutory filing as the basis of
diversification and relatedness measures. Several lines are logically combined in the following ways:
1. Fire and Allied lines is defined as the sum of “Fire” (line 1) and “Allied lines” (line 2).
2. Accident and Health is defined as the sum of “Group Accident and Health” (line 13), “Credit Accident
and Health” (line 14), and “Other Accident and Health” (line 15).
3. Medical Malpractice is defined as the sum of “Medical Malpractice–Occurrence” (line 11.1) and
“Medical Malpractice–Claims Made” (line 11.2).
4. Products Liability is defined as the sum of “Products Liability–Occurrence” (line 18.1) and “Products
Liability–Claims Made” (line 18.2).
5. Auto is defined as the sum of “Private Passenger Auto Liability” (line 19.1, 19.2),“Commercial Auto
Liability” (line 19.3, 19.4), and Auto Physical Damage (line 21).
6. Reinsurance is defined as the sum of “Nonproportional Assumed Property” (line 30),“Nonproportional
Assumed Liability” (line 31), and “Nonproportional Assumed Financial Lines” (line 32).
The final 24 lines are as follows: Accident and Health, Aircraft, Auto, Boiler and Machinery, Burglary and Theft,
Commercial Multi Peril, Credit, Earthquake, Farmowners’, Financial Guaranty, Fidelity, Fire and Allied lines,
5
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Size. Hardwick (1997) suggested that large insurers are likely to perform better
than small insurers because they can economize on unit cost associated with product
innovation and process improvement. Larger insurers may also have lower insolvency risk
which Sommer (1996) suggests can translate into higher prices ceteris paribus. Cummins
and Nini (2002) relate insurer size to market power, where we would expect larger
insurers to find greater revenue efficiencies than smaller insurers. Consistent with the
extant literature we expect size to be positively related to performance. We measure size as
the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE). Because we aggregate insurers at the group
level, we adjust group assets downward by the total intra-group common and preferred
stock holdings.6
Capitalization. When P/L insurers have a strong surplus position, they can become
more competitive by reducing premiums and loosening underwriting standards. Insurers
with greater capital can sustain unfavorable underwriting cycles for longer periods of time
thus giving them the opportunity to increase market share. In addition, Sommer (1996)
found that safer insurers are able to command higher prices. Therefore, we suspect a
positive relationship between insurer capitalization and performance. CAPASSETS is
measured as the ratio of policyholder surplus to total admitted assets.

Homeowners, Inland Marine, International, Medical Malpractice, Mortgage Guaranty, Ocean Marine, Other,
Other Liability, Products Liability, Reinsurance, Surety, and Workers’ Compensation.
If we did not adjust assets, all intra-group holdings would be double counted. For example, if insurer A and B
are in a group, and insurer B owns all of insurer A’s stock, the group’s assets would effectively double count
A’s assets if we did not adjust for B’s intra-group holdings.
6
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Ownership Structure. Our sample contains insurers classified as one of two different
organizational forms; namely, mutual insurers and stock insurers. Agency theory suggests
that self-interested managers will maximize their utility at the expense of the firms’ owners
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The market for corporate control aligns the owner-manager
conflict in stock insurers, where the mutual form is not as efficient. However, the mutual
form does align the interests of managers and owners (policy holders) thus reducing some
agency costs; although the owner-manager agency costs are thought to be higher (Mayers
and Smith 1981). The empirical evidence on the cost efficiency is mixed, where Cummins,
Weiss and Zi (1999) find mutual insurers are less cost efficient than stock insurers while
Greene and Segal (2004) find no difference in cost efficiencies between the two forms.
More recent literature suggests that stock insurers outperform mutual insurers when using
accounting based performance measures (Liebenberg and Sommer 2008; Elango, Ma, Pope
2008). Therefore we expect the binary variable MUTUAL to control for the costs and
benefits associated with organizational form and to be negatively associated with
performance.
Geographic Diversification. Controlling for the geographic spread of business is
accomplished through the use of geographic Herfindahl index, calculated using the
proportion of premiums written across fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia
(GEODIV). Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and Elango, Ma, and Pope (2008) found
geographic diversification to be negatively related to firm performance, thus we expect our
measure to be negative as well.
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Industry Concentration. We follow Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and measure industry
concentration as follows:
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𝑊𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡

(9)

𝐽=1

where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the weight of premiums written in line j in year t and 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 is an industrywide, line-specific Herfindahl, that measures the relative competitiveness of each line.
Insurers with smaller relative values for WCONC are writing in competitive business lines,
whereas larger values would indicate higher business concentration and less relative
competition. We expect WCONC to be positively related to performance.
Other control variables. The remaining control variables (percent life (PCTLIFE), line
of business dummies, time dummies, and state dummies) are all employed to capture
substantial firm-specific or market characteristics but are not pertinent to our
investigation. We also control for group participation in this specification. To conserve
space, we do not report the coefficients on the year, line of business, and state indicator
variables. The definitions and summary statistics are included in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]
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Given that our dataset consists of repeated firm observations over a ten year period,
we follow Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and Elango, Ma, and Pope (2008) and employ a
fixed-effect model using time-specific intercepts to test the relationship between
diversification strategy and firm performance. The use of time fixed effects allows us to
control for time-dependent variation in ROA. Because firm-level clustering may result in
inflated t statistics due to understated standard errors, we account for repeated firm
observations in our analysis and report significance levels with cluster-corrected standard
errors on all our estimates (Petersen 2009). With the possible endogenous choice of
diversification strategy based on concurrent profits, we use a number of measures to
ensure consistent estimators. The first method we use to control this possible endogenous
choice is to simply use once lagged relatedness scores as proxies for concurrent firm-level
relatedness (equation 10):

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + (𝛽1 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝛽1 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 ) + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡

(10)

+ 𝛽5 𝐺𝐸𝑂𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑊𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴5𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9 𝑀𝑈𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11−20 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛽21−43 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽44−94 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

Our next approach to deal with potential endogeneity bias is to use a two-stage least
squares and two-stage GMM estimators. The instrumental variable is the fitted value from
the following cross-sectional model:
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𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑡 +𝛿1𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑡 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑡 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜹𝑿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(11)

In equation (11), 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 is firm age. 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 can be defined as the weighted
average of an insurer’s business lines’ loss ratio volatilities. The weights used to compute
this variable are the insurer’s fraction of premiums written for each business line. We then
apply the weights to the industry-level loss ratio standard deviations which we use as our
measure of business line loss ratio volatility. 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 captures the growth
opportunities in an insurer’s book of business. 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 is the weighted average of
the relative business line sizes in which the insurer competes. Again, we use line of
business participation rates as the weights, where relative business line size is that
business line’s total industry premiums divided by total industry premiums across all 24
lines. This measure is similar to the industry size variable Santalo and Becerra (2008) use
to capture its effect on the diversification-performance relationship. Finally, we include the
vector of independent variables, 𝑿, as described in equation (10). Our choice of
instruments are based on known determinants of related diversification (BLRS, 2012).
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1.5 Empirical results

Diversification Strategy Hypothesis
A univariate ROA analysis across relatedness quartiles is presented in Table 2.
Likewise, Figure 1 displays a graphical representation of ROA across relatedness deciles,
where the first decile contains firms exhibiting the greatest level of unrelated
diversification, and the tenth decile contains firms exhibiting the greater level of related
diversification. The results of Table 2 and Figure 1 highlight an inverse relationship
between performance and relatedness. On average, we find that insurers with unrelated
books of business outperform insurers with more related books. The results from the
univariate analysis suggests a statistically significant difference in performance between
firms in the first quartile and firms in the fourth quartile, with the firms in the first quartile
(i.e., the most unrelated books of business) experiencing an average ROA of 2.5%,
compared to an ROA of 1.5% for those in the fourth quartile (i.e., the most related books of
business).
[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
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The estimates in Table 3 are parameters from four regression specifications of ROA
on weighted-average relatedness and several control variables. Columns 1 and 2 report
standard OLS regression estimates of equation 10 where relatedness is measured with the
raw relatedness score both concurrently and once lagged. Two-stage least squares and
two-stage GMM estimates are also reported in columns 3 and 4. The empirical results show
a negative relationship exists between relatedness (WAR) and firm performance (ROA)
across each of the four model specifications. The coefficients on the raw WAR scores
average -3%, and after controlling for the possible endogenous choice of diversification
strategy, the diversification-performance relationship appears much steeper with
coefficients averaging -9.2%. These results are consistent with the initial univariate results
and indicate that related diversification has, on average, a negative effect on firm
performance. We therefore reject null hypothesis 1, and provide some of the first evidence
that related diversification reduces accounting performance among P/L insurers. These
findings are consistent with those of Michel and Shaked (1984), Fan and Lang (2000) and
Pehrsson (2006).

[Table 3 about here]

Benefits to a related strategy depend on the ability of firms to create synergies
among similar resources (Teece 1980). However, these benefits require a high degree of
managerial cooperation, and communication between business segments. Inefficiencies
and other costs can manifest when firms attempt to leverage the same resources for an
24

increased number of activities, and thus poorer performance (Teece 1982). Counter to
related benefits, the economic benefits of unrelated diversification are based on efficiency
gains due to strong internal systems that can allocate resources and shift risk to performing
sectors (Williamson 1985). Our results indicate one of two things: (1) the costs associated
with a related strategy outweigh the benefits, or (2) ‘flexibility’ in resource allocation is
more valuable than synergy gains from core competencies.
Among other control variables, the coefficients on the SIZE variable are positive and
significant in each specification in Table 3. This finding is consistent with the extant
literature suggesting that larger firms can take advantage of economies of scale or lower
insolvency risk (Sommer 1996). CAPASSETS is positive and significant, indicating that
financial flexibility is associated with improved performance. GEODIV is negative and
significant, consistent with prior research (Elango, Ma, Pope 2008). We find limited
evidence that diversified mutual insurers underperform diversified stock insurers across
our sample period. The coefficient on MUTUAL is negative and significant in the first two
specifications, but is insignificant in the more robust specifications (columns 3 and 4). Our
findings also indicate that group-affiliated insurers underperform unaffiliated insurers.
This negative relation may be due to lower the costs of conglomeration, costs of managerial
discretion, or inefficient resource sharing between affiliates. Overall, we reject hypothesis
1, and find that firms following a related diversification strategy underperform those that
follow a more unrelated diversification strategy.

Organizational Form Hypothesis
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Two primary organizational structures exist among insurers, mutual insurers and
stock insurers. Agency costs should rise quicker within mutual insures than stock insurers
with the amount of discretion given to management because of the lack of market and
shareholder monitoring (Mayers and Smith 1982). Therefore, limiting the discretion of
mutual insurer managers should produce lower costs and improved performance.
Following a more related strategy is one method to reduce the managerial discretion
required by management, and should lead to performance gains for mutual insurers when
compared to stock insurers who do not need to limit managerial discretion. The results
reported in Table 4 are supportive of this notion, we find that stock insurers following a
more related strategy display weaker profitability compared to mutual insurers following a
more related strategy. Each specification, OLS and 2SLS, report negative and significant
coefficients (columns 1 and 2) for the stock subsample. And within the mutual subsample
specifications (columns 2 and 3), related diversification appears to be a nonfactor in
determining profitability. In short, the general finding on the relatedness-performance
relationship from Tables 2 and 3 apply to stock insurers (negative performance
relationship), and does not apply to mutual insurers. The difference in effect between the
two subsamples may be due to the reduced agency costs mutuals realize when they limit
managerial discretion by means of a related diversification strategy.

[Table 4 about here]

Robustness
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To ensure the robustness of our primary result that diversification is associated
with lower performance in U.S. based insurers, we utilize three robustness tests. First we
verify our result against a market-based performance measure, second we compare firm
performance after firms’ change their diversification strategy, and third we use cluster
analysis as an alternative measure of line relatedness.
Market-Based Performance Measure. If employing a related diversification strategy
leads to worse performance, market value should reflect our claim. Therefore, we use a
subsample of publicly traded insurers and repeat equation 10 using the natural log of
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value to assess whether our finding extends to a market-based
performance measure. We follow Christophe (1997), Shin and Stulz (2000), and Cummins
et al. (2006) in defining Tobin’s Q as the market value of equity plus the book value of
liabilities divided by book value of assets. The multivariate results in Table 5 provide some
evidence that the relatedness of the firm’s insurance business is negatively related to firm
value. In each specification, relatedness is negative, but only significant in the OLS
specification.
[Table 5 about here]
Changing Diversification Strategy. To further validate our results, we explore
profitability differences among newly diversified firms. Again we model profitability with
equation 10 and replace 𝑊𝐴𝑅 with variables that measure the change in diversification
strategy. The first variable is the absolute change in 𝑊𝐴𝑅:
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∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑖 = |𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 |.

(12)

For our sample of newly diversified firms, prior year’s relatedness score is equal to
one (𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 = 1), and the concurrent relatedness score is below one making any change
in diversification strategy negative. For ease of interpretation, we use the absolute value as
our measure of change in strategy, where larger values equate to a more unrelated
strategy. We expect ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅 to be positively related to performance, that is, the more
unrelated strategy employed the more profitable firms should be. The second measure is a
set of dummy variables indicating which change-quartile the firm belongs to. Firms with
the smallest change in strategy, ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑄1, are the omitted group. If our initial findings hold,
firms in ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑄2, ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑄3, ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑄4 should have higher profit margins as compared to
firms in ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑄1, therefore we expect positive parameter estimates for each indicator
variable. We identified 262 firms changing their diversification strategy during our sample
period. Because of the small sample, we do not use year, line, or state fixed effects.7
The results in Table 6 are consistent with the negative relatedness-performance
relationship found in Table 3. The absolute change in relatedness score is positive and
significant at the 1% level in the OLS and 2SLS specifications. These coefficients indicate
that larger changes in diversification strategy are associated with higher performance. We
also find similar results using the change-quartile indicators. As expected, all of the
coefficients are positive however, only ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑄4 is significant at the 1% level. These results

The number of control variables was reduced from 95 to 12. Our findings in Table 7 are not substantially
different using the full set of controls.
7
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indicate that firms in the largest change-quartile were 7.7% more profitable than firms in
the lowest change-quartile on average.
[Table 6 about here]
Alternative Measure of Relatedness. The essence of ‘relatedness’ is finding the
commonalities in our several lines of business. A method available for deciphering
commonalities and bundling like business lines together is factor analysis. Both Mayers and
Smith (1988) and Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) use cluster analysis to bundle like
business. We follow the Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) cluster analysis method by
applying the VARCLUS procedure in SAS to the matrix of direct premiums written per line
for all firms in our sample. This procedure identifies lines that tend to be written together
and therefore are assumed to be more related. After the related lines are identified, we use
a Herfindahl index to measure firm level concentration across the pools of relatedbusiness. Firms with related business will have a CLUSHERF score close to 1 while firms
with more unrelated business will have smaller CLUSHERF scores. We expect the
coefficient on CLUSHERF to be negative.
[Table 7 about here]
The results of our cluster analysis regressions are contained in Table 7. We test the
affect relatedness has on ROA using the full sample and a subsample of public insurers
using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Like in the previous tables, we model
performance using equation 10, however multicollinearity was an issue when we used
CLUSHERF and LOBHERF in the same model, therefore as a proxy for diversification extent,
we use a straight forward count of the number of business lines an insurer participates in
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(LINES). For both the full sample and public sample, the 2SLS specifications provide
significant results (columns 2 and 4), where the OLS specifications report no effect
(columns 1 and 3) between performance and our alternative relatedness measure,
CLUSHERF. Overall, CLUSHERF appears to have a negative effect on performance, although
significance levels are lower than in our previous models, the evidence does verify our
primary result. The variable LINES is significant and negative in each model, consistent
with the previous findings in Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) and Elango, Ma, and Pope
(2008) that diversification is associated with lower performance among P/L insurers.
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1.6 Conclusion
This article investigates the relationship between the relatedness of product
diversification and firm performance using a sample of diversified U.S. property-liability
insurance insurers over a ten year period. Prior literature has evaluated the effect of total
diversification on insurer performance; however, there is an absence of evidence on the
effect of diversification strategy for multi-line insurers. We are the first to test this
relationship using the relatedness measure developed by Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg,
Ruhland, and Sommer (2012). Theory suggests that related diversifiers should benefit from
economies of scope while unrelated diversifiers should benefit from uncorrelated earnings
streams.
The primary result of this study is that related diversification negatively impacts
accounting performance, ceteris paribus. We also find that the relatedness-performance
penalty does not apply to mutual insurers while stock insurers are subject to it. We explain
that agency costs are reduced within mutuals that employ a related diversification strategy
possibly offsetting the relatedness-performance penalty found in the full sample analysis.
This finding is consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis as posed by Mayers
and Smith (1982)
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Table 1.1
Summary Statistics and Variable Definitions (N = 5,439)
Variable

Definition

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

WAR

Weighted
relatedness

average

0.85

0.91

0.14

ROA

Return on assets, calculated
as the ratio of net income to
total assets

0.02

0.03

0.05

SDROA5

Standard deviation of ROA
over the previous five years

0.03

0.02

0.03

SIZE

Natural logarithm of total
assets

18.47

18.33

2.26

LOBHERF

Line of business Herfindahl
index

0.53

0.45

0.26

CAPASSETS

Ratio of total policyholders
surplus to total assets

0.47

0.44

0.20

GEODIV

Herfindahl index applied to
geographic
participation
across 51 regions

0.60

0.32

0.38

WCONC

Sum
of
industry
concentration
scores
multiplied by line-specific
participation

0.06

0.66

0.38

PCTLIFE

Percentage
of
total
premiums in life and health
lines of business

0.01

0.00

0.03

MUTUAL

Binary variable equal to 1 for
mutual insurers, and 0
otherwise

0.51

1.00

0.50

Cont.
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GROUP

Binary variable equal to 1 for
insurance groups, and 0
otherwise

0.45

0.00

0.50

Notes: Sample period covers 1995 – 2009. Five years of lagged consecutive data are required for the
computation of SDROA5; thus our analyses begin in year 2000. All relevant variables are in aggregated
at the group level (Berger et al., 2000). Total assets are adjusted downward by the total intra-group
holdings. ROA is trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. The key independent variable, WAR measures the
“relatedness” of a firm’s diversification strategy. This variable is bound between 0 and 1, where values
closer to 1 represents high levels of relatedness between the insurer’s business lines (Berry-Stölzle,
Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer 2012).
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Table 1.2
Pairwise Comparison of ROA Between WAR Quartiles
Panel A: ROA across WAR quartiles
Unrelated Strategy

ROA

Related Strategy

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

0.025

0.021

0.021

0.015

Panel B: Pairwise ROA t-tests (row minus column)
Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1 1.000
Q2 0.004***

1.000

Q3 0.004***

<-0.001

1.000

Q4 0.010***

0.006***

0.006***

1.000

Q1 - Q4 are the weighted average relatedness quartiles (WAR). Quartile 1 contains firms with the
most unrelated books of business, while quartile 4 contains firms with the most related books of
business. WAR measures the relatedness of firm-level diversification. Significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, * respectively.

34

Table 1.3
Diversification Strategy Effect: Full Sample Analysis
Model

OLS

WAR

-0.031***
(0.011)

Dependent Variable = ROA
OLS
2SLS
-0.094***
(0.026)

-0.089***
(0.026)

-0.004
(0.006)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.064***
(0.007)
0.008*
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.049)
0.043
(0.031)
-0.054
(0.045)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.012***
(0.003)
-0.112***
(0.022)

-0.026***
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.064***
(0.007)
0.008*
(0.004)
0.001
(0.048)
0.043
(0.031)
-0.053
(0.045)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.012***
(0.003)
-0.115***
(0.022)

-0.006
(0.006)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.067***
(0.007)
0.009*
(0.005)
-0.052
(0.055)
0.049
(0.032)
-0.039
(0.046)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.003)
-0.075***
(0.027)

-0.005
(0.006)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.066***
(0.006)
0.008*
(0.004)
-0.057
(0.054)
0.043
(0.032)
-0.044
(0.045)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.003)
-0.075***
(0.027)

5,439
0.179

5,439
0.179

5,360
0.173

5,360
0.175

WARt-1
LOBHERF
SIZE
CAPASSETS
GEODIV
WCONC
PCTLIFE
SDROA5
MUTUAL
GROUP
Constant
Observations
R-squared

2SGMM

Notes: Sample period is 2000 – 2009. In columns 1 and 2, coefficients are estimated by OLS. Columns 2 and 4
report two-stage SLS and GMM coefficients where in the first stage WAR is estimated by:
̂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑡 +𝛿1𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑡 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑡 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜹𝑿
𝑊𝐴𝑅
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the firm level. All models include year, line of
business, and state fixed effects. The key independent variable, WAR measures the relatedness of firm-level
diversification (Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer, 2012). LOBHERF is a line of business
Herfindahl index. SIZE is the natural log of total admitted assets, CAPASSETS is the ratio of surplus to total
admitted assets. GEODIV is equal to a Herfindahl index of premiums written across all reported geographic areas
(schedule T). WCONC is a line weighed metric of industry concentration (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008).
PCTLIFE is the percentage of premiums collected in life and health lines. GROUP is equal to 1 if the firm is an
aggregated group, 0 if it is a single, unaffiliated insurer. SDROA5 is the standard deviation of ROA over the past 5
years. Binary year controls are included but not reported with 2009 being the excluded year. Also not reported are
23 line-of-business and 50 state binary controls. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted
by ***, **, * respectively.

35

Table 1.4
Diversification Strategy Effect: Stock and Mutual Analysis
Dependent Variable = ROA
Stock
VARIABLES

OLS

WAR
WARt-1
LOBHERF
SIZE
CAPASSETS
GEODIV
WCONC
PCTLIFE
SDROA5
Group
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Mutual
2SLS

OLS

-0.079**
(0.031)
-0.022*
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.008)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.063***
(0.012)
0.016***
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.057)
0.116***
(0.044)
-0.125**
(0.051)
-0.010**
(0.004)
-0.084***
(0.030)
2,659
0.185

-0.002
(0.008)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.074***
(0.010)
0.017***
(0.006)
-0.065
(0.067)
0.120***
(0.044)
-0.130**
(0.055)
-0.011**
(0.004)
-0.068*
(0.036)
2,607
0.192

2SLS
-0.349
(0.215)

-0.020
(0.018)
-0.011
(0.011)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.072***
(0.009)
0.001
(0.006)
0.011
(0.073)
-0.037
(0.038)
0.110*
(0.061)
-0.015***
(0.004)
-0.177***
(0.029)
2,780
0.247

-0.022
(0.016)
0.009***
(0.002)
0.077***
(0.011)
0.012
(0.012)
-0.088
(0.109)
-0.023
(0.052)
0.162**
(0.080)
-0.018***
(0.006)
0.091
(0.170)
2,753
0.037

Notes: Sample period is 2000 – 2009. In columns 1 and 3, coefficients are estimated by OLS. Columns 2 and 4
report 2SLS coefficients where:
̂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑡 +𝛿1𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑡 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑡 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜹𝑿
𝑊𝐴𝑅
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the firm level. All models include year, line of
business, and state fixed effects. The key independent variable, WAR, is a weighted ratio of related premiums to
total net premiums written (Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer, 2012). LOBHERF is a line of
business Herfindahl index. SIZE is the natural log of total admitted assets, CAPASSETS is the ratio of surplus to
total admitted assets. GEODIV is equal to a Herfindahl index of premiums written across all reported geographic
areas (schedule T). WCONC is a line weighed metric of industry concentration (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008).
PCTLIFE is the percentage of premiums collected in life and health lines. GROUP is equal to 1 if the firm is an
aggregated group, 0 if it is a single, unaffiliated insurer. SDROA5 is the standard deviation of ROA over the past 5
years. Binary year controls are included but not reported with 2009 being the excluded year. Also not reported are
23 line-of-business and 50 state binary controls. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted
by ***, **, * respectively.
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Table 1.5
Robustness: Market-Based Performance Measure
Dependent Variable = ln(q)
OLS
2SLS

Model

-0.206
(0.207)

WAR
-0.143*
(0.084)
-0.008
(0.061)
0.006
(0.012)
-0.115
(0.097)
-0.046
(0.055)
0.245
(0.499)
0.004
(0.161)
-0.416
(0.485)
0.056**
(0.028)
0.092**
(0.040)
0.048
(0.272)

WARt-1
LOBHERF
SIZE
CAPASSETS
GEODIV
WCONC
PCTLIFE
SDROA5
MUTUAL
GROUP
Constant
Observations
R-squared

555
0.563

-0.009
(0.057)
0.008
(0.012)
-0.117
(0.087)
-0.041
(0.051)
0.189
(0.481)
0.002
(0.145)
-0.391
(0.474)
0.058**
(0.026)
0.090**
(0.038)
0.042
(0.256)
555
0.563

the natural log of Tobin’s Q where 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′ 𝑠𝑄 =
. Sample period is 2000 – 2009. In column 1, coefficients are
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
estimated by OLS. Column 2 reports 2SLS coefficients where:
̂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑡 +𝛿1𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑡 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑡 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜹𝑿
𝑊𝐴𝑅
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the firm level. All models include year, line of
business, and state fixed effects. The key independent variable, WAR, measures the relatedness of firm-level
diversification (Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer, 2012). LOBHERF is a line of business
Herfindahl index. SIZE is the natural log of total admitted assets, CAPASSETS is the ratio of surplus to total
admitted assets. GEODIV is equal a Herfindahl index of premiums written across all reported geographic areas
(schedule T). WCONC is a line weighed metric of industry concentration (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008).
PCTLIFE is the percentage of premiums collected in life and health lines. GROUP is equal to 1 if the firm is an
aggregated group, 0 if it is a single, unaffiliated insurer. SDROA5 is the standard deviation of ROA over the past
5 years. Binary year controls are included but not reported with 2009 being the excluded year. Also not reported
are 23 line-of-business and 50 state binary controls. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are
denoted by ***, **, * respectively.
Notes:

The

dependent

variable

is

𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑜𝑓𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑜𝑓𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
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Table 1.6
Analysis of Change in Diversification Strategy

Model
ΔWAR = |𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡 − 𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑡−1 |

OLS
0.145***
(0.049)

Dependent Variable = ROA
2SLS
0.330***
(0.112)

ΔWARQ2
ΔWARQ3
ΔWARQ4
LOBHERF
SIZE
CAPASSETS
GEODIV
WCONC
PCTLIFE
SDROA5
MUTUAL
GROUP
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.053
(0.044)
0.005
(0.006)
0.113***
(0.036)
0.014
(0.024)
-0.109
(0.212)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.532***
(0.126)
0.045**
(0.022)
0.013
(0.020)
-0.187
(0.121)
262
0.148

OLS

0.015
(0.051)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.042
(0.043)
0.022
(0.026)
-0.242
(0.224)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.595***
(0.126)
0.046**
(0.023)
0.026
(0.022)
-0.044
(0.135)
242
0.098

0.033
(0.024)
0.038
(0.025)
0.077***
(0.025)
0.055
(0.044)
0.005
(0.006)
0.117***
(0.036)
0.009
(0.024)
-0.105
(0.213)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.531***
(0.126)
0.042*
(0.023)
0.012
(0.020)
-0.191
(0.122)
262
0.151

Notes: Sample period is 2000 – 2009. Sample firms were single line insurers in year 𝑡 − 1 who added additional
lines in year 𝑡. In columns 1 and 3 coefficients are estimated by OLS. Column 2 report 2SLS coefficients where the
̂ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑡 +𝛿1𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑡 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 +
possible endogenous variable 𝑊𝐴𝑅 is estimated by: ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅
𝛿3𝑡 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜹𝑿. The third model compares the differences in ROA across relatedness quartile (∆𝑊𝐴𝑅𝑞),
where ∆𝑊𝐴𝑅1 (firms with the highest relatedness levels) is the omitted group. Standard errors (in parentheses).
Models 2, 4, 6 include year, line of business, and state fixed effects. The key independent variable, WAR measures
the relatedness of firm-level diversification (Berry-Stölzle, Liebenberg, Ruhland, and Sommer, 2012). LOBHERF
is a line of business Herfindahl index. SIZE is the natural log of total admitted assets, CAPASSETS is the ratio of
surplus to total admitted assets. GEODIV is equal to a Herfindahl index of premiums written across all reported
geographic areas (schedule T). WCONC is a line weighed metric of industry concentration (Liebenberg and Sommer,
2008). PCTLIFE is the percentage of premiums collected in life and health lines. GROUP is equal to 1 if the firm is
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an aggregated group, 0 if it is a single unaffiliated insurer. SDROA5 is the standard deviation of ROA over the past
5 years. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, * respectively.
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Table 1.7
Robustness: Alternative Measure of Related Diversification

Model
CLUSHERF
LINES
SIZE
CAPASSETS
GEODIV
WCONC
PCTLIFE
SDROA5
MUTUAL
GROUP
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable = ROA
OLS
2SLS
-0.007
(0.006)
-0.006**
(0.002)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.064***
(0.007)
0.007
(0.004)
0.004
(0.048)
0.041
(0.030)
-0.058
(0.044)
-0.005**
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.003)
-0.134***
(0.021)

-0.030*
(0.017)
-0.008***
(0.003)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.070***
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)
0.006
(0.049)
0.046
(0.030)
-0.054
(0.041)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.014***
(0.003)
-0.139***
(0.022)

5,439
0.177

5,360
0.179

Dependent Variable = ln(q)
OLS
2SLS
-0.017
(0.059)
-0.063*
(0.037)
0.006
(0.012)
-0.109
(0.098)
-0.084
(0.059)
0.359
(0.460)
0.010
(0.170)
-0.428
(0.493)
0.054*
(0.027)
0.087**
(0.037)
-0.034
(0.275)
555
0.569

-0.589*
(0.355)
-0.109**
(0.047)
0.026
(0.017)
-0.161
(0.118)
0.090
(0.137)
0.259
(0.547)
0.263
(0.315)
-0.200
(0.502)
0.069*
(0.036)
0.123**
(0.054)
0.038
(0.290)
555
0.427

Notes: Sample period is 2000 – 2009. Two samples are presented, columns 1 and 2 are all diversified
insurers, and columns 3 and 4 are publicly traded insurers. In columns 1 and 3, coefficients are estimated by
OLS. Columns 2 and 4 report 2SLS coefficients where:
̂ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0𝑡 +𝛿1𝑡 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑡 𝑊𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑡 𝑊𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜹𝑿
𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹
Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the firm level. All models include year, line
of business, and state fixed effects. The key independent variable, CLUSHERF, is the result of a
Herfindahl index applied to a cluster analysis of insurer-line participation. LINES is the number of
business lines. SIZE is the natural log of total admitted assets, CAPASSETS is the ratio of surplus to total
admitted assets. GEODIV is equal to a Herfindahl index of premiums written across all reported
geographic areas (schedule T). WCONC is a line weighed metric of industry concentration (Liebenberg
and Sommer, 2008). PCTLIFE is the percentage of premiums collected in life and health lines. GROUP is
equal to 1 if the firm is an aggregated group, 0 if it is a single, unaffiliated insurer. SDROA5 is the standard
deviation of ROA over the past 5 years. Binary year controls are included but not reported with 2009 being
the excluded year. Also not reported are 23 line-of-business and 50 state binary controls. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are denoted by ***, **, * respectively.
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ESSAY 2: RETURN AND LIQUIDITY RESPONSE TO SEC INVESTIGATION ANNOUNCEMENT
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2.1 Introduction

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was originally designed to restore
investor confidence in capital markets by providing investors and the markets with reliable
financial information and clear rules of honest dealing.8 Crucial to the SEC’s effectiveness is
its ability to enforce securities regulation. Though the SEC has been actively enforcing
regulation and combatting financial misconduct for many years, very little is known about
the impact SEC actions have on firms during the enforcement process. This paper seeks to
examine the effects the SEC has on firms during the investigation process. Specifically we
examine changes to investor confidence by evaluating market quality metrics of
investigated firms from the announcement of an investigation to the resolution of it.9
Academics contest whether the benefits of equity regulation outweigh the costs as
the empirical evidence appears to be mixed (Zingalas, 2009; Christensen, et al., 2011).
Moreover, critics of the SEC argue that market forces and other exogenous technological
changes have rendered the agency “obsolete” (Macey, 1994), or that the agency is
ineffective due to inherent flaws due to its relationship with the U.S. Congress such that
securities regulation is vulnerable to cyclical patterns of neglect and “hysterical
overreaction” (Pritchard, 2004). A bi-partisan report on the 2008 financial crisis blames
the SEC for “widespread failures in financial regulation” and cites the SEC as a major

http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
Market quality measures have often been used to evaluate investor uncertainty (Jain, Kim, and Rezaee,
2008).
8
9
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contributor of the recession (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Others in the
media have also called for the abolishment of the SEC due to its ineffectiveness.10 The
mission of the SEC is clear, however many question the agency’s ability to provide the
market with economic benefits that justify its existence. One of the goals of this paper is to
show that securities regulation, by way of enforcement proceedings, can provide
measurable benefits to firms and market participants. If the current function of the SEC is
to simply deliver additional fines and punishment over and above market imposed
penalties, then enforcement proceedings are likely to further damage investor confidence.
Conversely, the SEC’s actions could reassure traders that additional corrective forces and
transparency are likely to correct bad behavior and force improvement within firms
accused of fraud. This paper focuses on the benefits and costs of SEC investigations, and to
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to directly test the impact government
enforcement actions have on market quality through the investigation process.
To address this issue we examine market quality during various periods of the
enforcement process. We compare changes in average daily returns, daily price volatility,
spreads, and illiquidity in three different time periods that relate to the major stages of the
enforcement process. We classify the three stages of the enforcement process as: (1) the
violation period, which is the period of time that the company engaged in misconduct until
it was initially revealed to the market; (2) the trigger period, which is the time period
immediately following the market learning of the misconduct to when it was announced
that the SEC had opened a formal investigation; and (3) the investigation period, which is

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-08-30/one-more-reason-to-shut-sec-and-start-overcommentary-by-william-d-cohan
10
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the time period in which the SEC investigated the target firm to the resolution of the
investigation. The impact of SEC enforcement actions will be evident in the changes in our
proxies between the trigger period and investigation period. If government enforcement
improves market quality, then returns should increase while price volatility, spreads and
illiquidity should decrease.
Using a sample of 327 SEC investigation announcements from 1977 through 201111,
we find that during the investigation period, returns and price volatility improve while
liquidity is harmed. Specifically our univariate tests show significant improvements as daily
returns improve by 15 basis points and daily price range tightens by 12%. Spreads show an
increase of 2.2%, and illiquidity is 8.4% higher. Although trading costs are higher following
the SEC’s involvement, the massive improvements in risk and returns bolster the argument
for federal regulation of financial misconduct in that the current regulating authority has
been successful in restoring investor confidence in the firms it investigates.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, while previous
studies focus on large negative stock market reactions to the announcement of fraud or
subsequent enforcement actions (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Karpoff et al.
2008a; Leng et al., 2011), our paper shows how equity values change across the entire
enforcement process. This is often overlooked and might explain the divergent results in
papers that exclusively look at other related events such as restatement announcements,
shareholder class-action lawsuits, and fraud-related news announcements as these events
often happen in different stages of the enforcement process (Karpoff, et al., 2012). Second,

11

We thank Karpoff, Lee, and Martin for graciously providing the data on SEC enforcement proceedings.
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the extant literature has not established whether an investigation increases or decreases
firm value, equity volatility, or trading costs. As the investigation period is when the SEC
becomes heavily involved with an accused firm, the patterns in equity movements and
trading costs during this period can show the agency’s impact on investor confidence.
Third, we show that the SEC has an overall positive impact on firm value and equity
volatility. This finding provides support for SEC proponents showing that in this area, the
SEC is providing an important benefit to the traders of the firms accused of fraud.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II is an overview of the securities
enforcement process. Section III reviews the literature and establishes a set of hypothesis
to guide our empirical analysis. Section IV describes the data and sample selection.
Empirical results are presented in Section V and we conclude in Section VI.

55

2.2 SEC Investigation Process

Of the SEC’s five divisions, the Enforcement Division is responsible for detecting and
investigating firms that violate US securities laws. Fraudulent conduct can be prosecuted in
both civil and criminal court, however the SEC is only responsible for civil enforcement and
administrative actions. Criminal conduct is referred to the Department of Justice and/or
the appropriate U.S. Attorney’s office.
“Most enforcement actions follow a conspicuous trigger event that publicizes the
potential misconduct and attracts the SEC’s scrutiny. Common trigger events include selfdisclosure of malfeasance, restatements, auditor departures, and unusual trading (Karpoff
and Lou, 2010:1882).” Investigations begin with a general inquiry, or “informal”
investigation where investigators work with the cooperation of the target firm. Informal
investigations are not made public by the SEC so as to not harm the target firm’s reputation
if no fraud occurred. Information and testimony are volunteered rather than subpoenaed.
If there is enough evidence to suggest fraud, the SEC’s staff will seek authorization to
conduct a formal investigation. Following a “formal order” from the SEC the investigators
are then authorized to compel testimony from witnesses and subpoena documents. At this
point, managers of the firm generally disclose to the public that the SEC has opened a
formal investigation. If the investigators determine that they have collected enough
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evidence to indicate fraud occurred, the SEC then formally files an enforcement action,
known as an AAER, against the target firm. These enforcement actions are the first
information released by the SEC to the market. Following the enforcement action, the SEC
will then file charges in civil court to disgorge improperly earned returns, assess fines, and
levy other administrative punishments.
To help illustrate the full enforcement process, consider Nvidia Corp.’s enforcement
experience. In early 2000 Nvidia was lagging in performance projections. Nvidia
management entered into an agreement with a supplier that granted a $3.3 million in cost
savings for the current quarter, but Nvidia agreed to pay significantly higher prices in the
following quarter to compensate the supplier for the current-quarter savings. By failing to
account for the increase liability expected in the next quarter, Nvidia overstated gross
profits and quarterly earnings. Nvidia’s share price surged 18% on May 17, 2000, the day
after the company reported earnings. In November 2011, several Nvidia employees were
under investigation for insider trading. During that investigation, details began to emerge
about the overstated financial statements. Nvidia launched an internal investigation and
issued a restatement of their financial reports on February 14th, 2002. The next day the SEC
began an informal inquiry which graduated to a formal investigation in June 2002. SEC
regulatory proceedings ended in September 2003, Nvidia’s CFO was fined $671,694 and
was prohibited from serving as an officer or director of a public company for five years.
Figure 1 summarizes the corresponding sequence of events specific to Nvidia’s SEC
enforcement experience and highlights the three regulatory periods we examine in our
study.
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Figure 1 about here
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2.3 Literature Review

Government Regulation
There exists a broad literature on the effects of government securities regulation
and litigation. “The academic debate on the costs and benefits of securities regulation is
controversial and the evidence is fairly mixed. Whether or not securities regulation is
beneficial to the economy appears to be largely an empirical matter (Christensen et al.,
2011).”12 Early theories by Stigler (1964) and Peltzman (1976) argue “that regulatory
agencies will not exclusively serve a single economic interest” (Peltzman, 1976 p. 1), and
that “the costs [of regulation] probably exceed even a reasonably optimistic estimate of
benefits” (Stigler, 1964 p. 124). This rational is sometimes explained as the “no-effect
hypothesis”, in that the costs and benefits of regulation reach equilibrium in Peltzman’s
model. Though, evidence of the no-effect hypothesis is mixed. Bowman’s (1983) findings
support Stigler’s no-effect theory in that SEC regulation has no impact on the risk or
returns of firms accused of financial statement fraud. Bowman compares firms accused of
fraud before and after the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and concludes that disclosure
requirements have no measurable positive effect on NYSE traded securities. However,
empirical studies by Jain and Rezaee (2006), Jain et al.(2008), and Li et al.(2008) suggest

Christensen et al. (2011) cite evidence of the debate in Coffee (1984), Easterbrook and Fischel (1984),
Shleifer (2005), Mulherin (2007), Leuz and Wysocki (2008), and Zingales (2009).
12
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that some market regulation has produced economic benefits. Both Jain and Rezaee (2006)
and Li et al. (2008) find positive equity market reactions to the passing of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) which indicates that stronger market-place integrity and regulation
promotes investor confidence. Jain et al. (2008) also report improved investor confidence
as measured by long-run positive trends in spreads and liquidity following the passage of
SOX.
SEC enforcement actions have been shown to have large negative effects on the
firms it investigates. Prior research often focuses on Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases or AAERs when measuring the costs and benefits of SEC enforcement actions.
Dechow et al. (1996) document negative returns and increases to the cost of capital to
firms subject to an AAER. Leng et al. (2011) find significant negative abnormal returns in
the three years following an AAER, and that firms are more likely to fail post-AAER
announcement.
While AAER announcements are the first time the SEC publicizes the target’s
violation of fraud, this is not the first the market learns of the financial misconduct. Firm
managers are required to publicly disclose material information related to the equity value
of a firm.13 Studies that evaluate public disclosures of SEC investigations find significant
negative market reactions to these announcements. Feroz et al. (1991) observe a -6%

13

Feroz et al. (1991) p. 111:
“The 1934 Act Release No. 5092 requires the public disclosure of material information; this
would include formal investigations by the enforcement division. An anonymous SEC
enforcement lawyer (WSJ [September 22, 1983], p. 35) explains, ‘When the SEC tells a company
it's a target, securities laws require disclosure to shareholders. This turns a private investigation
into a public one... and if the investigation shows the party was innocent, the notification and
forced disclosure could have blown a public offering or a reputation needlessly.”
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abnormal return at the disclosure of an investigation. Using a more comprehensive data
source, Karpoff et al. (2008a) document a -13.74% return on investigation disclosure days.
Negative market reaction to investigation announcements implies that the investigation
itself is a viable sanction that the SEC can use to maintain credible financial markets.
Another line of research evaluates how effective the SEC is in its mission to improve
investor confidence by documenting changes in returns and volatility following passage of
Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD). This literature offers conflicting results. The SEC
implemented RFD in October 2000, where the motivation for RFD was to improve the
information flow to all types of investors and to improve the confidence of individual
traders. Some literature on this event finds improved or no effect to stock price volatility or
analyst dispersion post-RFD (Heflin et al., 2001; 2003; Defusco et al., 2010). On the other
hand, many articles cite worsening conditions post-RFD as price volatility and analyst
dispersion increase (Mohanram and Sunder, 2002; Irani and Karamanou, 2003; Bushee et
al., 2004). These conflicting findings indicate that the SEC was partly successful in
accomplishing its stated goals as information did appear to fairly reach all trading
participants, however if investor confidence was measured with volatility and analyst
dispersion, then some of the research indicates that the SEC failed to improve investor
confidence. Similar to prior research, we are testing one of the stated goals of the SEC’s
Division of Trading and Markets which is to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets.14
We test the agency’s capacity to maintain efficient markets by evaluating the effect its

14
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presence has on daily returns, price volatility, spreads, and illiquidity of firms accused of
fraud.
To the best of our knowledge Murphy, Shrieves, and Tibbs (2009) is the only research
that directly tests the change in risk following an allegation of corporate misconduct. They
find significant increases in the standard deviation of returns and analyst dispersion
following the initial revelation of fraud (the trigger event), but offer no evidence as to the
mitigating effect the presence the SEC may have on their measures. Our research is
different in that we evaluate the effects on volatility and other measures after the SEC
investigation announcement.
The mission of the largest securities regulating body in the world, the Securities
Exchange Commission is to promote investor confidence. One strategy the SEC employs to
accomplish its mission is investigating firms that violate securities law (Casey, 1973).
Theory suggests that regulator action may result in limited or no benefits, and the
empirical evidence to this effect is mixed. If the investigations make investors more
concerned about internal problems or future prospects, then we should observe
deterioration in investor confidence measures as measured by market quality metrics.
However, if through the SEC’s investigation process the firm corrects internal problems
and bad behavior, then market participants may respond positively during the
investigation thereby improving market quality. This leads us to the following testable null
hypothesis that SEC investigations will have no effect on investor confidence.
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2.4 Research Design
Timeline of events. To evaluate to what extent investor confidence reacts to the
inclusion of SEC enforcement proceedings, we compare four common measures of market
quality from the time the accused firm violates securities law until the resolution of the
enforcement process. The four measures we use include daily returns, daily price volatility,
spread, and illiquidity.15 Figure 1 also highlights the three major regulatory time periods
used in our study: (1) the violation period, the period of time that the company engaged in
misconduct until the trigger event, or when it was initially revealed to the market; (2) the
trigger period, the time period immediately following the market learning of the
misconduct to when it was announced that the SEC had opened a formal investigation; and
(3) the investigation period, the time period in which the SEC became involved with the
target firms until the resolution of the enforcement process. The impact SEC enforcement
actions have on investor confidence will be evident in the changes in our proxies between
the trigger period and investigation period.
Daily Returns and Daily Price Volatility. In our univariate tests, we compare average and
median daily returns and daily price volatility between the three regulatory time periods in
Figure 1. Because intraday transaction-level data are not available for our entire sample we

Each measure has been used extensively in the literature as proxy for investor confidence or investor
uncertainty, different sides of the same coin (Ozoguz, 2009). A non-exhaustive list is as follows:
1. Returns: Jain and Rezaee (2006), Li et al. (2008), Sturm (2003)
2. Volatility: Leahy and Whited (1996), Heflin et al. (2001), (2003), Defusco et al. (2010),
Mohanram and Sunder, (2002), Irani and Karamanou, (2003), Bushee et al. (2004)
3. Spread: Bhattacharya and Spiegelman (1991), Saar (2001), and Palmrose et al. (2004)
4. Amihud (2002) illiquidity: Bardos (2011)
15
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follow O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2011) in measuring volatility using the daily price range scaled
by closing price.

𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 

𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡

(1)

We use regression analysis to estimate the changes in our proxies of investor
confidence to three major regulatory periods while controlling for several significant
market and firm specific characteristics. We model returns and daily price range using the
Fama and French (1993) three factor model and add two binary variables (VioPeriod and
InvPeriod) to estimate the conditional change in the dependent variable with respect to the
period of time where the market was responding to the news of misconduct (TrigPeriod)
and the inclusion of the SEC (InvPeriod). A positive and significant InvPeriod would suggest
that investors earned positive excess returns during the period the SEC was investigating
the firm compared to the period that the market had alpha in the return model would
indicate that investors experienced more positive or more negative returns compared to
the trigger period:

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛿1 (𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝛿2 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  𝛿3 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛿4 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 +
(2)

𝛿5 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .
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Our dependent variables are 𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 , where 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the risk free rate
(one month T-bill), 𝑅𝑀𝑡 is the market return, SMB is the average return of a portfolio of
small cap stocks minus the return of a portfolio of high cap stocks, HML is the average
return of a portfolio of firms with high book-equity to market-equity minus a similar
portfolio of low book-equity to market-equity. We also include a variable to account for the
magnitude of the fraudulent event, TrigCAR, which is the two day cumulative abnormal
return of the trigger event (-1, 0). If the SEC is successful in reducing investor uncertainty
in these firms then we should see 𝛿5 as positive and significant in the return models and
negative in the price range models.
Spread and illiquidity. We follow Jain et al. (2008) in measuring changes in investor
confidence following major regulatory events with changes in market quality using spreads
and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure. Corwin and Schultz (2012) develop a low
frequency bid-ask spread estimator using daily high and low prices. With a sample of U.S.
stocks from 1993 through 2006, Corwin and Schultz show that their CRSP based spread
measure is highly correlated with high frequency effective spreads where the average
cross-sectional correlation coefficient between the two variables is as high as 0.93. We
further investigate the liquidity aspect by using Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure,
Illiq, which is defined as daily absolute stock return divided by daily dollar volume scaled
by 106 . It measures the dollar trading volume needed to move stock prices. Illiq is
computed as follows:
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𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑡 =

|𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 | ∗ 106
𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡

(3)

As with many proxies, estimates can produce very large or very small outliers. To
minimize the influence of outliers, all proxies are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. We
model our two liquidity measures with the well-known determinants of spread, Size, Price,
Volume, and volatility as measured by the past 5 day standard deviation of returns, RSTD
(McInish and Wood, 1992). We add our two binary variables of interest to measure the
average change in liquidity over the regulatory process:

𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .
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(4)

2.5 Sample Selection

Data on SEC enforcement actions was provided by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a,
b KLM database hereafter). It consists of SEC and Department of Justice (DOJ) enforcement
events for financial misrepresentation from April 1976-Setember 2011 (1,105 events).
Enforcement events are violations of one of the three provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934: (i) 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), which requires firms to make and
keep books, records, and accounts which accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
keep and maintain books and records that accurately reflect firm assets; (ii) 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(b)(2)(B), which requires firms to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to assure that transactions are recorded accurately and scrutinized
regularly; and (iii) 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(5), which states that no person shall knowingly
circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting controls or
knowingly falsify any book, record, or account.16 From the KLM database, we restrict our
sample to firms with a complete set of identifying dates that correspond with the three
regulatory periods which are pertinent to our study. The identifying dates are the
misconduct begin date (viobegdt), the trigger event date (trigdt), the investigation
announcement date (invdt), and the date in which the enforcement proceedings ended

See Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2012) for a full description of the hand-collection processes, sources,
and aggregation of these data.
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(regenddt). We also require that firms have matching market and financial data in CRSP
and Compustat. These restrictions leave us with 390 unique firms. However, in order to
evaluate the effect SEC investigations have on return and liquidity metrics, we require
firms to have actively traded during all three regulatory periods. Of the 390 unique firms,
63 stopped trading before the investigation announcement and are thus removed from our
sample. Therefore, our final sample consists of 327 firms subject to securities enforcement
due to fraud.

Table 1 about here

Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for key variables and control variables for
firms in our sample. Note that the number of daily firm observations are heavily weighted
in the violation period and the investigation period making up 47% and 42.3%
respectively. This is not surprising as Panel B shows that the median violation period is
2.63 years, the median trigger period is just over 9 months long, and the median
investigation period is 2.69 years.
Panel C of Table 1 highlights the frequency of investigations over time. The earliest SEC
investigation announcement is April 4, 1977, where the Ralph M. Parsons Corp violated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act when two payments of $300,000 and $6,000,000 went to
union officials and overseas recipients as bribes for large commercial contracts,
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respectively. The payments were recorded as “employee welfare expense” on the books.17
Panel C also shows that investigation events ramped up in the early 2000s, corresponding
with the SEC’s expansion from 2002-2005. During that time Congress doubled the SEC’s
budget resulting in the hiring over 1,000 new employees in response to public concern
over the wave of corporate fraud and corruption. Our sample is not reflective of all SEC
enforcement actions, but rather enforcement actions on public companies that violated the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and meet our data requirements as discussed above.

17

http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1978/dig081078.pdf
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2.6 Results

Before analyzing the cross-sectional determinants of changes in investor confidence
following an SEC’s investigation announcement, we first examine the changes to the means
and medians in returns, return volatility, spreads, and illiquidity between the regulatory
events illustrated in Figure 1 including the violation period (VioPeriod), the trigger period
(TrigPeriod), and the investigation period (InvPeriod). We use parametric t-statistics,
calculated from the cross-sectional standard error to compare means, and report MannWhitney Sum Rank differences and Z scores to test the difference in medians.

Univariate results
Table 2 reports changes in returns and price volatility, and Table 3 reports changes
in spreads and illiquidity from the beginning of the violation to the end of the enforcement
proceedings. Panel A in Table 2 show that average daily returns drop 15 basis points
following an announcement of financial misconduct. The announcement of fraud has a
similar negative effect on price volatility, where daily price volatility is shown to be 31%
higher during the trigger period than during the violation period. Because each of these
regulatory events can last several years for some firms, we limit the sample in Panel B to a
maximum of 365 days before the trigger event, 365 days following the trigger event, and
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365 days following the investigation announcement. We follow a similar procedure for
Panel C and limit the sample to 6 months before/after the trigger and investigation
announcement dates. In this way overly represented firms (firms with very long regulation
periods) do not bias our results. Panels B and C confirm the result in the full sample
analysis, that when firms’ financial misconduct is publicized, returns and price volatility are
worse in the trigger period than in the violation period, consistent with Karpoff, et al.
(2008).
While these findings conform with earlier findings, the primary contribution of this
study lies in the change in market quality between the trigger period and the investigation
period, which is the period where the market reacts to the news that the SEC has opened a
formal investigation. Our univariate results offer mixed evidence regarding the total effect
SEC enforcement proceedings have on returns and volatility. As reported in Panels A, B,
and C the mean daily return has significantly improved during the investigation period,
though the sum-rank tests on returns report higher (Panel A), lower (Panel B), and then
insignificant (Panel C) changes in returns across our samples. The impact on firm price
volatility is also highly dependent on the sampling criteria. The full sample analysis shows
that equity price volatility improved following the investigation, where Panel B and Panel C
show that equity prices were mover volatile during the investigation period than the
trigger period. Therefore, armed with only univariate statistics, we cannot say whether the
SEC is successful in restoring investor confidence in firms under investigation.

Table 2 about here
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We further analyze the impact of an SEC investigation by evaluating changes in
liquidity in Table 3. Spreads are estimated using the low frequency method of Corwin and
Schultz (2012) and illiquidity is measured using Amihud’s (2002) price impact metric.
Results therefore must be interpreted with caution as we do not directly observe daily
liquidity per se. Our two estimates in Table 3 are inverse liquidity measures, that is, an
increase to either will indicate worsening conditions. We find that liquidity is harmed
following the announcement of fraud. In each panel, spreads and illiquidity are significantly
higher in the trigger period than in the violation period. Panel A shows that average
spreads substantially increases by 38% and illiquidity doubles in the period following the
public announcement of fraud. Following investigation announcements however, we see
more mixed results. In the full sample, mean spreads show improvements compared to the
trigger period, where mean illiquidity appears higher in the investigation period. Panels B
and C also indicate that spreads and illiquidity are higher in the investigation period.
Overall, our univariate tests fail to yield consistent results as to the effect that SEC
enforcement actions have on the market quality of the firms it investigates.
Table 3 about here
Regression analysis
To further explore whether investor confidence improves following government
enforcement actions, we test for a systematic relationship between our proxies of investor
confidence and the major regulatory time periods controlling for firm and market
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determinants. In Table 4 we model daily returns using the Fama and French (1993) 3 factor
model and use dummy variables to indicate regulatory periods, with the omitted period
being the trigger period. Thus we interpret the coefficients on VioPeriod and InvPeriod as
the difference in returns from trigger period returns. The primary variable of interest,
InvPeriod, represents the effect SEC enforcement actions have on the dependent variable,
daily stock returns. The coefficients reported in Table 4 for VioPeriod are positive and
significant in all three return models and increase in magnitude with the limited samples.
In the full sample model, the coefficient of 0.00145 suggests that the average daily return
during the violation period was 36.29% higher than the daily return during the trigger
period. This finding was expected and confirms the findings of Karpoff et al. (2008) and
Murphy et al. (2009) who find large negative market reactions to the revealing of fraud. As
for the investigation period (InvPeriod), the coefficients are also positive and significant,
and nearly the same magnitude as the VioPeriod coefficients suggesting that during the
investigation period daily returns rebound to what they were before the market discovered
the financial misconduct. These results strongly support the notion that the enforcement
proceedings positively impact firm equity value. The full sample results in the daily price
volatility model suggest that the volatility in daily prices also improves during the
investigation period as the coefficient is negative and significant on InvPeriod. However,
the coefficients become positive and significant when we limit the sample to 365 days and
6 months from the investigation announcement. This result implies that although returns
are improving during these windows, the risk associated with these returns have also
substantially increased for at least the first year.
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Table 4 about here

The results reported in Table 5 support the univariate findings that liquidity is
harmed following an announcement of financial misconduct. Both spread and ILLIQ are
inverse measures of liquidity, therefore the negative and significant estimates for
VioPeriod confirm that spreads were lower and ILLIQ was lower during the violation
period (coefficients of -0.0026 and -0.3145 for the full sample models respectively). While
these findings are not unexpected, we are the first to document the changes in liquidity
following the public announcement of fraud. The coefficients on InvPeriod suggest that
both spreads and illiquidity are substantially higher following SEC involvement. This
finding is consistent with Bardos (2011) and Firth, Rui, and Wu (2011) who find
significantly higher illiquidity and wider spreads for up to one year following other
regulatory-related events.
Our multivariate results on the effect of SEC enforcement actions on several market
quality measures offer some mixed results. With our return metrics, our results suggest
that after the SEC gets involved with a firm accused of fraud, daily returns and daily price
volatility improve to almost the pre-trigger period levels. However, when we examine the
liquidity response, it would appear that liquidity providers are charging higher rates to
make markets in these accused firms. Moreover, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity also
increases suggesting that prices are far more sensitive to trading activity following SEC
involvement.
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Table 5 about here

As a robustness measure, we divide our sample into decades based on the year of
the trigger event and report the results in Table 6. The sequence of the regressions is
identical to that in Table 3 and 4, for brevity, we only report the coefficients and standard
errors for VioPeriod and InvPeriod. Panel A of Table 6 show that daily returns and price
volatility through are higher during the violation period and investigation periods, though
in Panel B, price volatility isn’t significantly different from the trigger period price
volatility. Spreads and illiquidity show the same patterns as in Tables 4 and 5, where we
find significant increases during the investigation time period.

Table 6 about here
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2.7 Conclusion

Previous literature on financial misconduct often focuses on the legal and
reputational penalties following an announcement of malfeasance, which is important as
that line of work highlights the direct costs of fraud. The purpose of our work is to
empirically test the collective changes in investor confidence following U.S. Securities
Exchange Commission investigation announcements. We ask whether there are added
benefits to the SEC investigating firms accused of fraud? Specifically, how effective is the
SEC in accomplishing its original purpose – to restore investor confidence? To answer
these questions we empirically examine four proxies of investor confidence (returns, price
volatility, spreads, and illiquidity) across three major regulatory periods (the violation
period, the trigger period, and the investigation period). We employ both univariate and
multivariate tests to determine the net effect of SEC enforcement proceedings.
In examining the average daily returns across the regulatory periods, we find that a
significant 19 basis point drop in the average daily return following the trigger event.
However, in the period in which the SEC is investigating the firm, average daily returns are
15 basis points higher. Daily price volatility follows this same pattern, decreasing by 12%
during the investigation period. Our multivariate analysis confirms this result using the
Fama and French (1993) three factor model. This initial finding confirms that the SEC is
successful in restoring investor confidence in firms accused of fraud in terms of returns and
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return variance. However, our liquidity proxies indicate that the SEC’s investigation
diminished investor confidence. In the multivariate models, using spreads and illiquidity as
the dependent variable, we find that spreads were wider and illiquidity was worse during
the investigation period.
This paper helps shed light on the effectiveness of the SEC in accomplishing its
mission to restore investor confidence. The economic benefit of the SEC’s involvement can
easily be seen by the improvements in risk and returns of these firms, though market
participants can expect to see higher acquisition and liquidation costs when establishing
their position in these firms. Overall, our findings are supportive for the proponents of
federal regulation of equity markets.
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Table 2.1
Summary Statistics
Notes: The sample contains 327 firms subject to an SEC investigation from 1977 to 2011, observations are at the daily level.
SIZE is the log of market cap. PRICE is the CRSP daily closing stock price. VOLUME is log of daily trading volume. RET is
the daily return as reported in CRSP. PVOL is the daily high price minus the daily low price scaled by the closing price. SPREAD
is the daily spread estimate using the Corwin and Schultz (2012) simple spread measure. ILLIQ is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
measure which is absolute return divided by dollar volume. RSTD is the five day rolling standard deviation of returns. TrigCAR
is the 2-day cumulative abnormal return at the trigger event (day -1 and day 0). VioPeriod is the regulatory period preceding
the public announcement of fraud. TrigPeriod is the time following the announcement of fraud until the SEC investigation
announcement, and InvPeriod is the time period following the investigation announcement to the resolution of all regulatory
proceedings.

Panel A: Summary Statistics
SIZE
PRICE
VOLUME
RET
PVOL
SPREAD
ILLIQ
RSTD
TrigCAR
VioPeriod
TrigPeriod
InvPeriod

N (firm days)
516,074
516,074
513,016
515,973
516,074
502,566
504,761
514,798
327
250,559
53,299
225,615

Mean
20.1935
22.7363
12.1343
0.0006
0.0522
0.0155
0.4304
0.0348
-0.1764
47.05%
10.63%
42.32%

Median
20.2191
15.7500
12.3967
0.0000
0.0359
0.0069
0.0021
0.0255
-0.1221

STD
2.2869
23.9042
2.7762
0.0477
0.0627
0.0240
2.2769
0.0334
0.2002

Mean
1,208.8

Median
959.0

STD
930.8

254.5

158.0

281.1

1,453.8

1,227.0

982.0

Years

Frequency

Cumulative
Frequency

Cumulative
Percent

1976-1980
1981-1985
1986-1990
1991-1995
1996-2000
2001-2005
2006-2011

1
17
20
47
44
135
63

1
18
38
85
129
264
327

0.92%
5.50%
11.62%
25.99%
39.45%
80.73%
100%

Panel B: Regulatory Period Length (days)
VioPeriod

Days from the beginning of the
violation period to the trigger date

TrigPeriod

Days from the trigger event to the
investigation announcement

InvPeriod

Days from the investigation
announcement to the end of the
enforcement process

Panel C: Investigation events by year
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Table 2.2
Changes in Returns and Price Volatility
The sample contains 327 firms subject to an SEC investigation form 1977 to 2011, observations are at the daily level. Return
is the daily return as reported in CRSP. Price Volatility is the daily high price minus daily low price scaled by closing price. Tstatistics for means and approximate Z-statistic for medians are reported in parentheses.
a – significantly larger than the Trigger Period
b – significantly larger than the Violation Period
c – significantly smaller than the Trigger Period
d – significantly smaller than the Violation Period

Panel A: Means and Medians – Full Sample
VioPeriod
Mean Return 0.0007a

TrigPeriod

InvPeriod

-0.0008d
(7.40)
0.0000d
(6.24)
0.0623b
(57.61)
0.0423b
(48.92)
53,299

0.0007a
(5.84)
0.0000c
(3.74)
0.0551c
(20.50)
0.0356c
(35.68)
212,216

TrigPeriod

InvPeriod

(2.84)
0.0489c
(39.81)
0.0351c
(32.74)
76,445

-0.0014d
(4.61)
0.0000d
(2.84)
0.0631b
(39.81)
0.0417b
(32.74)
38,825

0.0006a
(4.93)
0.0000a
(1.87)
0.0662a
(5.31)
0.0408c
(3.86)
66,156

VioPeriod

TrigPeriod

InvPeriod

-0.0005a
(4.36)
0.0000a
(1.80)
0.0514c
(27.21)
0.0366c
(24.22)
39,793

-0.0024d
(4.36)
0.0000d
(1.80)
0.0651b
(27.21)
0.0426b
(24.22)
26,419

-0.0001a
(4.23)
0.000
(1.14)
0.0706a
(7.31)
0.0434
(0.72)
35,036

(7.40)

Median Return 0.0000a
Mean Price Volatility
Median Price Volatility

(6.24)
0.0477c
(57.61)
0.0349c
(48.92)
250,559

N
Panel B: Means and Medians – 365 day limit

VioPeriod
Mean Return 0.0001a
(4.61)

Median Return 0.0000a
Mean Price Volatility
Median Price Volatility

N
Panel C: Means and Medians – 6 month limit
Mean Return
Median Return
Mean Price Volatility
Median Price Volatility
N

79

Table 2.3
Changes in Liquidity Estimates
The sample contains 327 firms subject to an SEC investigation form 1977 to 2011, observations are at the daily level. Spread
is the daily spread estimate using the Corwin and Schultz (2012) simple spread measure. ILLIQ is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
measure which is absolute return divided by dollar volume. T-statistics for means and approximate Z-statistic for medians are
reported in parentheses.
a – significantly larger than the Trigger Period
b – significantly larger than the Violation Period
c – significantly smaller than the Trigger Period
d – significantly smaller than the Violation Period

Panel A: Means and Medians – Full Sample
VioPeriod
Mean Spread 0.0130c

TrigPeriod

InvPeriod

0.0180b
(48.82)
0.0078b
(25.11)
0.5468b
(31.19)
0.0025b
(31.19)
52,390

0.0177c
(2.09)
0.0076c
(1.29)
0.5927a
(3.47)
0.0016c
(3.47)
208,630

VioPeriod
Mean Spread 0.0140c
(26.17)
Median Spread 0.0065c
(14.65)
Mean Illiquidity 0.3299c
(13.23)
Median Illiquidity 0.0027c
(4.38)
N 74,803
Panel C: Means and Medians – 6 month limit

TrigPeriod
0.0179b
(26.17)
0.0078b
(14.65)
0.5065b
(13.23)
0.0027b
(4.38)
38,013

InvPeriod
0.0204a
(13.35)
0.0085a
(8.25)
0.7487a
(13.06)
0.0030a
(6.48)
64,832

VioPeriod

TrigPeriod

InvPeriod

0.0148c
(15.46)
0.0067c
(8.33)
0.3437c
(7.09)
0.0028c
(1.71)
38,966

0.0179b
(15.46)
0.0078b
(8.33)
0.4636b
(7.09)
0.0027b
(1.71)
25,873

0.0206a
(11.17)
0.0086a
(7.37)
0.7146a
(11.19)
0.0034a
(9.30)
34,235

(48.82)

Median Spread 0.0061c
Mean Illiquidity
Median Illiquidity

(25.11)
0.2665c
(31.19)
0.0026c
(31.19)
243,741

N
Panel B: Means and Medians – 365 day limit

Mean Spread
Median Spread
Mean Illiquidity
Median Illiquidity
N
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Table 2.4
Changes in returns and price volatility during SEC investigations
The sample contains 327 firms subject to an SEC investigation from 1977 to 2011, observations are at the daily level.
Dependent variables are return minus the risk free rate, and daily price volatility (PVOL) which is the daily high price
minus daily low price scaled by closing price. The regressions model the change in average excess return and price
volatility before and after the three regulatory periods defined in Figure 1. The omitted period is the trigger period.
VioPeriod is a binary variable that equals 1 if the observation was in the time period from when the misconduct
happened to when it was publicized to the market. InvPeriod is a binary variable equal to one if the observation date is
after the date the SEC launched its investigation, zero otherwise. SMB, HML, and MKRF follow the Fama and French
(1993) three factor model. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Full Sample

12 month
limited
sample

6 month
limited
sample

Dependent Variable = Returns
Alpha

VioPeriod
InvPeriod
SMB
HML
MKRF
TrigCAR

Observation
s

R2

Full Sample

12 month
limited
sample

6 month
limited
sample

Dependent Variable = PVOL

-0.00104***
(0.00024)
0.00145***
(0.00026)
0.00144***
(0.00027)
0.71238***
(0.01288)
0.21634***
(0.01454)
1.12954***
(0.00756)
0.00098**
(0.00040)

-0.00152***
(0.00029)
0.00143***
(0.00034)
0.00185***
(0.00039)
0.76389***
(0.02536)
0.13323***
(0.02908)
1.14886***
(0.01441)
0.00176**
(0.00077)

-0.00212***
(0.00038)
0.00185***
(0.00045)
0.00216***
(0.00051)
0.73287***
(0.03515)
0.09911**
(0.03956)
1.19138***
(0.01977)
0.00390***
(0.00113)

0.05711***
(0.00029)
-0.01429***
(0.00031)
-0.00883***
(0.00033)
-0.26249***
(0.01815)
-0.18690***
(0.01936)
-0.14876***
(0.01041)
-0.03677***
(0.00055)

0.05291***
(0.00036)
-0.01623***
(0.00040)
0.00130**
(0.00051)
-0.30122***
(0.03280)
-0.21975***
(0.04045)
-0.16452***
(0.02029)
-0.07049***
(0.00106)

0.05235***
(0.00047)
-0.01574***
(0.00052)
0.00437***
(0.00070)
-0.26468***
(0.04587)
-0.22372***
(0.05820)
-0.16602***
(0.02921)
-0.08359***
(0.00159)

510,288
0.077

180,444
0.056

101,491
0.054

510,383
0.019

180,484
0.045

101,516
0.053
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Table 2.5
Changes in liquidity during SEC investigations
The sample contains 327 firms subject to an SEC investigation from 1977 to 2011, observations are at the daily level.
Dependent variables are the Corwin and Schultz (2012) CRSP spread estimate and Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity
which is the absolute return divided by daily dollar volume. The regressions model the change in liquidity before and after the
three regulatory periods defined in Figure 1. The omitted period is the trigger period. VioPeriod is a binary variable that equals
1 if the observation was in the time period from when the misconduct happened to when it was publicized to the market
InvPeriod is a binary variable equal to one if the observation date is after the date the SEC launched its investigation,
zero otherwise. SIZE is the log of market cap, VOLUME is the log of daily volume, and RSTD is the five day return
standard deviation. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***,
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Full Sample

12 month
limited
sample

6 month
limited
sample

Dependent Variable = Spread
Constant

VioPeriod
InvPeriod
Size
Price
Volume
RSTD
TrigCAR

Observation
s

R2

Full Sample

12 month
limited
sample

6 month
limited
sample

Dependent Variable = Illiquidity

0.05693***
(0.00077)
-0.00262***
(0.00011)
0.00129***
(0.00012)
-0.00159***
(0.00005)
-0.00001***
(0.00000)
-0.00131***
(0.00003)
0.23688***
(0.00380)
0.00338***
(0.00018)

0.06887***
(0.00141)
-0.00160***
(0.00015)
0.00175***
(0.00016)
-0.00216***
(0.00009)
-0.00000
(0.00000)
-0.00132***
(0.00006)
0.21852***
(0.00645)
0.00353***
(0.00035)

0.06883***
(0.00193)
-0.00121***
(0.00019)
0.00155***
(0.00021)
-0.00203***
(0.00013)
-0.00001**
(0.00000)
-0.00150***
(0.00009)
0.20228***
(0.00908)
0.00205***
(0.00050)

2.77580***
(0.06822)
-0.31449***
(0.01052)
0.18990***
(0.01148)
0.13412***
(0.00536)
-0.00124***
(0.00014)
-0.44964***
(0.00523)
19.16890***
(0.35586)
0.57866***
(0.01657)

3.64036***
(0.12963)
-0.17830***
(0.01325)
0.20057***
(0.01534)
0.11695***
(0.00994)
0.00167***
(0.00026)
-0.50083***
(0.00937)
20.05839***
(0.64976)
0.78307***
(0.03241)

3.45631***
(0.16650)
-0.15905***
(0.01602)
0.17670***
(0.01894)
0.13366***
(0.01309)
0.00087***
(0.00033)
-0.50716***
(0.01278)
17.50777***
(0.85213)
0.62847***
(0.04450)

496,929
0.233

174,655
0.249

98,292
0.233

497,891
0.206

176,495
0.226

99,314
0.215
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Table 2.6
Time Sorted Regressions
This table presents the coefficients on VioPeriod and InvPeriod for several subsamples based on the year of the Trigger Event. For example, if firm AAA’s trigger
event occurred in 1981, than all observations for that firm would be included in the 1980’s subsample. Estimates for VioPeriod and InvPeriod are the results of
equation (2) for Returns and PVOL, and equation (4) for Spread and ILLIQ applied to each subsample. Subsamples in Panel B are based on trigger event dates before
and after the date Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed into law, July 30, 2002. The 1970s and 2010s were excluded due to low trigger events (2 and 1 respectively).
Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Panel A: 10-year sort

1970s
1980s

Returns
VioPeriod

InvPeriod

-0.0010

-0.0015

(0.0023)

(0.0018)

0.0027**
(0.0012)

1990s

0.0019**
(0.0008)

2000s

PVOL

0.0011***
(0.0004)

0.0027*
(0.0014)
0.0024**
(0.0010)
0.0016***
(0.0004)

VioPeriod

0.0204***
(0.0018)
-0.0189***
(0.0016)
-0.0347***

Spread

ILLIQ

InvPeriod

VioPeriod

InvPeriod

VioPeriod

0.0020

-0.0001

0.0005

-0.0641

(0.0014)

(0.0011)

(0.0009)

(0.0565)

0.0015
(0.0018)
0.0067***

-0.0033***
(0.0006)
-0.0037***

(0.0010)

(0.0015)

(0.0004)

-0.0098***

-0.0009*

-0.0005***

(0.0004)

(0.0005)

(0.0001)

0.0094***
(0.0007)
0.0039***
(0.0004)
0.0004**
(0.0002)

-0.0484
(0.0620)
-0.2635***
(0.0386)
-0.1523***
(0.0111)

InvPeriod

0.1827**
(0.0821)
0.4117***
(0.0734)
0.1612***
(0.0429)
0.1817***
(0.0143)

Panel B: Pre and Post Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Pre
SOX

0.0019***
(0.0005)

Post
SOX

0.0009**
(0.0004)

0.0026***
(0.0006)
0.0008**
(0.0004)

-0.0256***
(0.0006)
-0.0030***
(0.0004)

0.0023***

-0.0029***

(0.0008)

(0.0002)

0.0001

0.0003*

(0.0004)

(0.0001)

0.0025***
(0.0003)
0.0003**
(0.0001)

-0.2453***

0.3284***

(0.0222)

(0.0253)

-0.0816***

-0.0027

(0.0110)

(0.0107)
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Sample
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Figure 2.1
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ESSAY 3: EXPLAINING THE DIVERSIFICATION-PERFORMANCE PENALTY: A
LONGITUDIANAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS SEGMENT PERFORMANCE
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3.1. Introduction
A large body of research has shown that diversification is linked with significant
equity discounts and poor performance. Studies by Lang and Stultz (1994), Berger and
Ofek (1995), Laeven and Levine (2007), Berger et al. (2010), Ammann et al. (2012), and
Hoechle et al. (2012) all show evidence of negative externalities related to corporate
diversification. Though many authors have presented and tested various explanations for
the discount, a consensus regarding the cause of the discount is has yet to emerge. One
explanation is that diversified firms fail to efficiently allocate corporate resources (Lamont,
1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). An alternative
explanation links the diversification penalty with agency theory where self-interested
managers pursue diversification at the expense of the shareholder. For example, Jenson
(1986) argues that managers take on value-destroying projects to increase their own
power and prestige (empire building). Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Lamont and Polk
(2002) suggest that managers diversify in order to increase their own compensation. Other
agency-driven motives include managerial entrenchment18 (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and
risk reduction in the manager’s personal portfolio (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Still, other
papers question whether the diversification discount even exists. Campa and Kedia (2002)
argue that firms could choose to diversify in response to poor performance in the existing

When firms take on a unique set of business lines, the top executives then become “specialists” or uniquely
qualified to manage that set of business lines. The specialist-manager is then very hard to replace due to the
specific skill set required to run the conglomerate firm.
18
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business segments, and that after accounting for the endogenous diversification selection,
the discount disappears altogether. Furthermore, Villalonga (2004a) asserts that problems
associated with traditional data sources are responsible for the discount found in other
studies.19 She finds that a diversification premium exists when using a more detailed data
source.
This paper examines three questions related to the source of the diversification
discount. First, is poor pre-diversification performance by diversifiers the source of the
observed post-diversification discount? We are not the first to ask this question, however
the current evidence is mixed. Weston and Mansinghka (1971), Gort et al. (1985), Lang and
Stultz (1994), and Graham et al. (2002) find that diversifying firms display lower
performance prior to diversifying while Campa and Kedia (2002) and Hyland and Diltz
(2002) find higher performance ratios in diversifying firms prior to a diversifying event.
Second, is poor post-diversification performance by existing/original lines the source of the
observed post-diversification discount? The resource misallocation hypothesis suggests
that the addition of a new business line provides managers an opportunity to misallocate
human capital and financial capital across the firm (Harris et al., 1982; Rajan et al., 2000;
Lamont and Polk, 2002). If these firms disproportionally allocate attention and resources
to the new lines from the old lines then we expect to see falling profit margins in the
existing business lines after the firm acquires a new line. Third, is poor performance of
newly added lines the source of the observed post-diversification discount? One

The COMPUSTAT Segment file is the most commonly used data source for diversification research.
Villalonga (2004a) identifies several shortcomings with these data such as limited business segments, nonuniform reporting standards, or errors due to self-reporting, and lack of profitability metrics.
19
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implication of the agency hypothesis of diversification is that managers are selecting valuedestroying or underperforming business lines in order to net personal gains at the
shareholders expense (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, if these agency conflicts are the primary
drivers of the diversification discount, then we would expect to see low levels of
profitability in the new business lines.
To answer our research questions, we use a sample of U.S. property-casualty
insurers for the years 2000-2012. Data are obtained from the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) annual reporting database. There are several advantages
to using the NAIC database to answer our research questions. First, performance data are
available at the business-unit level, which allows us to directly test the effects of
diversification without the restraints imposed by traditional financial reports such as
minimum business unit size, ad-hoc categorization of industries by management, or errors
due to self-reporting (Davis and Duhaime, 1992; Villalonga, 2004a).20 Second, our
methodology requires that we are able to accurately identify when a firm diversifies, the
clarity of the NAIC data is ideal for our research methods as there is no ambiguity in
classifying business units.21 Lastly, we are able to evaluate both private and public firms as
all insurers are required to report to state regulatory offices each year. To-date, the core
diversification literature has focused almost exclusively on publicly traded firms. To
answer our first research question, we use these data in a longitudinal analysis, centered at
the diversification year, and compare the performance of diversifying firms against the

COMPUSTAT Segment data reports only business units that comprise of more than 10% of total firm sales.
Hyland and Diltz (2002) identified that only 72% of the reported changes from one segment to multiple
segments are economically meaningful diversification events. Considering the 10% reporting standard, much
of the reported changes are due to managerial discretion in classifying segments than actual organizational
structure changes.
20
21
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performance of peer non-diversifying firms.22 For the second and third research question,
we decompose the firm into its new and old business lines and compare the loss ratio of the
two components.23 This method allows us to determine which component is the primary
source of the diversification discount. We follow up our univariate statistics with
regression analysis to verify the robustness of our primary findings.
The findings related to our three research questions are as follows: First, we find
evidence that diversifying firms underperform in the three years before the diversification
event compared to their non-diversifying peers. We also find that the performance
disparity between diversifying and non-diversifying firms dramatically widens in the postdiversification period, evidence consistent with the diversification discount literature.
Second, we find that in the year the firm diversifies, the existing business segment loss ratio
increases (worsens) from 58.8% to 64.2%. This finding implies that declining performance
in the existing business lines contribute to the diversification discount. Third, we find that
the new business line’s loss ratio is significantly lower (57.2%) than the existing business
line’s loss ratio for at least three years following the inclusion of the new line. This evidence
is inconsistent with the idea that agency conflicts are responsible for the diversification
discount, instead of finding that managers are selecting value-destroying business lines, we
find that managers are selecting more profitable lines. However, this evidence also suggests
that the inclusion of a new line diverts attention and resources away from the firm’s core
segments, which then leads to significant declines in the firm’s overall operating

We compare diversifying firms against firms that (1) do not diversify during the sample period and (2)
operate in the same primary business line. We use three measures of performance in the longitudinal
analysis, ROA, UROA (underwriting return on assets), and the loss ratio.
23 The segment-level performance measure used in our analysis is the loss ratio, which is the ratio of losses
plus expenses to premiums earned. A low loss ratio equates to high profitability.
22
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performance, consistent with the resource misallocation explanation of the diversification
discount.
We add to the existing literature on diversification and firm performance by
providing a comprehensive analysis detailing a potential source of the diversification
discount. One of the unique features of this paper is our ability to separate and individually
track the performance of the existing business lines from the new business lines. Prior
studies have yet to explicitly test whether the source of the diversification discount is the
underperformance of the new or existing line(s) as data limitations leave only industrylevel proxies to infer business line characteristics (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Shin and Stulz,
1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Hoechle et al., 2012). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first
to provide an empirical analysis showing from which lines (new or existing) the poor
performance of diversifying firms originates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews previous
literature on the diversification discount. We develop our hypotheses in Section III. Section
IV provides a description of our data and control variables. Section V contain our results,
and Section VI concludes with a brief summary.
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3.2 Prior Literature

3.2.1 The Diversification Discount
The focus versus diversification literature is well established among financial
economists, although a consensus has yet to emerge in the debate as to the true valuation
and performance implications to firms that diversify. Early inter-industry evidence from
Lang and Stulz (1994) suggest that Tobin’s Q and firm diversification were negatively
related during the 1980s and that diversifying firms underperformed firms that did not
diversify. Berger and Ofek (1995) compare the imputed values of diversified firms to their
market values (excess value) and report that diversified firms trade between 13% and 15%
below their imputed values. Also, Servaes (1996) findings show that the diversification
discount was present during the 1960s. The inter-industry evidence almost exclusively
uses the COMPUSTAT segment file as the primary source for segment-level data, though
much as been written on its limitations. Villalonga (2004b) warns researchers of using the
segment file for diversification research as it (1) fails to fully disclose the true extent of
diversification for conglomerates, (2) defines business segments too broadly, (3) and that
firms frequently change the segments they report when no real change has taken place
(Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Hyland and Diltz, 2002). Using an alternative data source,
Villalonga (2004b) reports that diversified firms trade at a significant premium compared
to single-segment firms. Her study, as well as others, highlight the importance of accuracy
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in segment reporting and call into question the robustness of the studies using the
COMPUSTAT segment database.
We avoid the drawbacks of using the COMPUSTAT segment file to study the effects
of diversification by using a more complete database of diversification activities, the NAIC
database. Moreover, the work of Santalo and Becerra (2008) identifies substantial
differences in the valuation effects of diversification between industries, therefore an intraindustry study allows us to avoid this confusion. Santalo and Becerra also advocate testing
the effects of diversification by means of a longitudinal analysis of diversifying moves,
which is the method we employ here.
There has been substantial diversification research that has been done using an
intra-industry sample, particularly in banking and insurance. Because our sample is the U.S.
property casualty insurance industry, we will limit the intra-industry discussion to the
relevant findings in this area. Given that the benefits of diversification are more likely to be
pronounced within industry than across industries (creating value by leveraging core
competencies), it is striking to see that much of the insurance literature finds support for
the diversification discount as documented by the early inter-industry studies. Hoyt and
Trieschmann (1991) compare mean returns for focused insurers and those that diversify
across both life-health (L/H) and property-casualty (P/C) and find that equity of focused
insurers produced superior returns compared to equity of diversified insurers. Tombs and
Hoyt (1994) also reported lower risk-adjusted returns for diversified insurers using a
Herfindahl index across 10 lines of business. Both Elango, Ma, and Pope (2008) and
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) find strong evidence that multi-line insurers
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underperform single-line insurers as measured by ROA. Furthermore, both report lower
market valuations as measured by Tobin’s Q.

3.2.2 Explaining the Discount
Given the substantial research supporting the diversification discount, a new stream
of research has set out to explain this phenomenon. A number of plausible explanations
have been presented such as capital misallocation and cross subsidization (Lamont, 1997;
Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000) and agency cost theory (Jensen,
1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Hyland
and Diltz, 2002). The latest findings, however, call into question the very existence of the
diversification discount and/or report that diversified firms trade at a premium rather than
a discount (Villalonga, 2004a; Campa and Kedia, 2002). The work of Graham et al. (2002),
Campa and Kedia (2002), Borghesi et al. (2007) all support the notion that diversified firms
are systematically different from the average single-segment firm, and that failure to
control for these differences can lead to incorrect inferences about the effect of
diversification on firm performance.

3.2.3 Resource Misallocation
The negative impact of corporate diversification is often explained in terms of poor
allocation of scarce resources across firm divisions. Support for the resource misallocation
hypothesis is based on evidence that division-level investment is affected by factors other
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than investment opportunity. For example, Lamont (1997) finds that investment in non-oil
divisions of large petroleum companies was affected by changes in oil prices during the
1980’s. Thus, his findings show that capital allocation to a division of a diversified firm
depends on the success of the firm’s other divisions that are in unrelated industries. Shin
and Stulz (1998) show that investments made by one segment of a diversified firm are
dependent on the cash flows of the other segments. Scharfstein’s (1998) findings supports
the notion of capital “socialism”. He finds that diversified firms invest less than their
industry peers in their high-opportunity segments (high Tobin’s Q), and invest more in
segments with low-opportunity (low Tobin’s Q) than their peers. Rajan et al. (2000)
present a model where internal power struggles affect resource allocation and
consequently drive investment toward the most inefficient divisions. Consistent with their
model, they find that diversified firms tend to overinvest in low Q segments. Mitton’s
(2012) empirical tests suggest that the lower productivity in diversified firms worldwide is
due more to the misallocation of resources than other explanations.
A well-managed diversified firm should be more valuable than single-segment firm
because single-segment firms lack the same ability to generate and effectively distribute
internal resources (Shin and Stulz, 1998). However, resources should be allocated to
divisions with high growth opportunities and performance but the findings in this line of
research show that the average diversifier fails to appropriately allocate these scarce
resources, thus leading to poor performance and discounted equity.

3.2.4 Agency Cost
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A related line of research has argued that agency costs are responsible for the
observed discount and lower performance in conglomerate firms. Through the eyes of
agency theory, diversification is based on the idea that because ownership is diluted across
many parties, individual shareholders lack the motivation and ability to monitor and
discipline managers. Managers are then free to pursue their own personal objectives which
often times are not in the shareholder’s interest (Matsusaka, 2001). For example, Roll
(1986) theorized that CEO hubris can lead to overconfidence in merger target evaluations
which can subsequently lead to overpayment during acquisitions. Jensen (1986) famously
theorized that managers “have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal
size. Growth increases managers’ power by increasing the resources under their control (p.
2).” Jensen’s model predicts that diversification programs are more likely to generate
losses than gains as managers may seek value-destroying projects to generate personal
gains. Other research on this topic argues that managers diversify to increase
compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), entrench themselves by diversifying the firm
into specialized lines whereby the managers become harder to replace (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1989), or reduce the risk of their personal portfolios which cannot be easily
diversified (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Hyland and Diltz (2002) present evidence of several
agency-driven motives for diversification. They show that top management receive higher
compensation following diversification, and that free cash flow variables are strong
positive factors that influenced the decision to diversify in probit regression models. All of
these results are consistent with the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). In a
recent study, Ammann et al. (2012) show that the diversification discount increases with
firm leverage and is nonexistent in all equity firms. They explain that this phenomenon is
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due to managers in levered firms aligning with creditors thereby reducing the risk of the
firm at the expense of equity holders. Hoechle et al. (2012) findings suggest that corporate
governance variables explain most of the diversification discount, therefore the
diversification discount and agency theory appear to be linked.

3.2.5 The diversification-discount debate
Though much has been written to explain the diversification discount, other studies
question whether the discount even exists at all. Many of these studies explain that perhaps
a priori differences, inadequate data, measurement error, specification error, or flawed
benchmarks are responsible for the diversification discount found in prior work. For
instance, Graham et al. (2002) show that newly acquired segments by diversifying firms
were trading at a discount before the acquisition and that this could explain the source of
the diversification discount, even if the diversifying acquisition itself creates value. Campa
and Kedia (2002) argue that firms self-select into diversification and that failure to control
for endogenous choice to diversify is what has led other researchers to conclude that
diversification destroys value. For example, “[i]f poorly performing firms tend to diversify,
then not taking into account past performance and its effect on the decision to diversify will
result in attributing the discount to diversification activity, rather than to the poor
performance of the firm (Campa and Kedia, 2002 p. 1732).” After controlling for
endogeneity, they find the diversification discount always drops, and in some cases
becomes a premium. However, recent work by Ammann et al. (2012) and Hoechle et al.
(2012) find that the diversification discount persists even with controls for endogeneity.
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Villalonga (2004a) uses propensity score matching and Heckman’s (1979) two-stage
method to evaluate the valuation differences between diversified and single-segment firms.
With each method, the diversification discount disappears. Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010)
argue that the perceived diversification discount is an artifact of differences in the
uncertainty of growth rates between diversified firms and their focused-firm benchmarks.
Hund, Monk and Tice (2012) find that the standard excess value approach in diversification
research is flawed due to the inherent differences between diversified and focused firms,
and that after controlling for these differences diversified firms trade at a premium
compared to similar focused firms.
Table 1 synthesizes the extant literature pertaining to the diversification discount is
synthesized in Table1.

[Table 1 about here]

104

3.3 Hypotheses
The existing literature has yet to directly test whether the source of the
diversification discount originates from poor performance in existing lines or from poor
performance in the new lines. The lack of segment-level performance data are primarily
responsible for the paucity of these explicit tests (Villalonga, 2004b). To fill this gap, we use
a sample of U.S. insurers with performance data available at the segment-level. In this
section we develop hypotheses related to the potential sources of the diversification
discount.

3.3.1 Prior Performance
One line of theoretical work that builds on the benefits of diversification, predicts
that firms have an incentive to dynamically change their organizational structure following
poor performance in existing business lines. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue
that when poor performance of the firm threatens a manager’s job, he may have incentive
to enter a new business line. Matsusaka (2001) models diversification strategy as a
dynamic value-maximizing process. His model suggests that poorly performing firms will
seek new products that match their organizational capabilities, “[t]hus it is poor
performance (the lack of good uses of organizational capabilities in existing businesses)
that causes diversification, not the other way around (pg. 410).” Burch et al. (2000)
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theorize that diversification can be the result of value-maximizing efforts of managers in
response to unfavorable industry conditions. The Gomes and Livdan (2004) model implies
that firms diversify after they become relatively unproductive in their current activities.
This line of theoretical work motivates our first test of pre-diversification performance,
suggesting that diversifying firms should experience low performance before diversifying.
Empirical studies show mixed evidence that diversifying firms underperform in the
pre-diversification period. For example, several studies show that diversifying firms exhibit
poor performance in the period prior to diversification. The findings of Weston and
Mansinghka (1971) and Gort, Grabowski, and McGuckin (1985) show that diversifying
firms have lower accounting performance prior to diversification compared to firms that
do not diversify. Similarly, Lang and Stulz (1994) show that operating income of
diversifying firms is lower relative to firms that do not diversify. May (1995) also finds
evidence that firms move into new industries following poor performance in their primary
business. However, Servaes (1996) shows that the Tobin’s Q of diversifiers and nondiversifiers are not significantly different in the pre-diversification period. Hyland and Diltz
(2002) find that diversifying firms were not undervalued and maintained a higher sales
multiplier in the pre-diversification period. Also, Campa and Kedia (2002) report that
during single-segment years, diversifying firms have higher CAPX/SALES and EBIT/SALES
ratios than firms that remained focused. Overall, the empirical evidence is mixed as to
whether firms diversify following poor performance.
The theoretical work of Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Burch et al. (2000), Matsusaka
(2001), and Gomes and Livdan (2004) suggest that firms will seek new business as a result
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of poor performance. However, the extant literature has yet to clearly establish whether
diversifying firms exhibit poor performance in the years leading up to the diversification
event as the empirical evidence is mixed. Thus leading us to our first testable hypothesis:

H1 (prior performance hypothesis): Diversifying firms will have low performance relative to
their non-diversifying peers in the pre-diversification period.

3.3.2 Post Performance
Two explanations for poor post-diversification performance has are (1)
exacerbated managerial agency problems where the manager diversifies out of self-interest
at the expense of the shareholder (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and (2) the
failure of conglomerate firms to allocate scarce monetary or human resources across
divisions (Harris et al., 1982; Lamont and Polk, 2002). One of the unique features of our
study is that we can disaggregate the firm into its pre-diversified segments and its new
business segments. By tracking the post-diversification performance of the two segments
we can isolate the effects diversification have on the existing business segments and, for
the first time, directly measure how profitable the new business lines are. If diversifying
firms poorly allocate resources, we should see declines in the performance of the existing
business segments consistent with Harris et al. (1982) and Lamont and Polk (2002).
Furthermore, if the diversification discount stems from managers diversifying to maximize
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personal gains at the expense of the owners (agency theory), then we would expect the
new business segment to underperform compared to the old business segment.
The empirical results of Liebenberg and Sommer (2008), Elango et al. (2008), and
others have shown convincingly that diversification is associated with poor performance in
the insurance industry. However, the source of the discount has not clearly been identified.
While we cannot directly measure resource transfers between divisions, if diversified firms
fail to appropriately allocate managerial or monetary resources, then the results of these
transfers are likely to be manifested in declining segment-level performance post
diversification. As this mechanism could be the source of the diversification discount, we
hypothesize that a firm’s preexisting business segment’s performance will decrease
following a diversification event.

H2 (resource misallocation hypothesis): Preexisting business segment performance will
decrease following a diversification event.

On the other hand, it could be that the source of the diversification discount stems
from poor managerial decisions as to what lines these firms diversify into. The agency
theory of diversification implies that managers are likely to undertake low-benefit or even
value-destroying business segments to increase their own power and prestige (Jensen,
1986), become entrenched inside the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), increase
compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), spend free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), or for other
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personal motives. Therefore we hypothesize that a firms’ new business segments
performance will underperform compared to the existing business segment performance
levels.

H3 (agency theory hypothesis): New business segment performance will underperform
compared to the existing business segment.
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3.4 Sample and data
Our empirical analyses uses data from U.S. property-liability insurance companies
obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) database for
the years 2000 through 2012. Our state-level macroeconomic data are collected from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.24 The sample includes firms which report positive values for
assets and premiums written, have a complete set of control variables, and are organized as
either a stock or mutual insurer.25 We aggregate all variables for insurers that are affiliated
with an insurance group, as insurance groups may implement strategies and risk
management practices at the group level rather than at the firm level (Berger et al., 2000).
We define diversification as the acquisition of a business line the insurer wrote no business
in during the previous year. The final sample yields 1,797 unique insurers, of which 676
diversify at some point during the sample period and 1,121 insurers who do not diversify
into a new line of business.

3.4.1 Performance Measures

www.bea.gov.
We follow prior literature and eliminate uncommon insurer types such as Lloyds, reciprocals, HMDI
corporations, and risk retention groups (Liebenberg and Sommer, 2008; Elango, Ma, and Pope, 2008).
24
25
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We use three measures of accounting performance to evaluate the diversificationperformance relationship: return on assets (ROA), underwriting return on assets (UROA),
and the loss ratio (LR). ROA takes into consideration profit and loss from both business
operations and investment activity and is computed simply as the ratio of net income to
total assets. UROA measures the profit and loss from insurance activity and is computed as
the ratio of net underwriting income to total assets. The LR is our direct measure of annual
performance and is computed as:

𝐿𝑅 = 

𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑

(1)

Where direct losses are total claims against insurance policies (paid and unpaid)
over the year. Loss adjustment expense are the costs associated with adjusting insurance
claims such as investigation costs and legal defense costs. Premiums earned is the portion
of premiums written throughout the year that can be applied to the expired portions of
insurance contracts.
All three performance variables can be used to measure overall firm performance
on an annual basis and thus are appropriate for testing Hypothesis 1. Testing Hypothesis 2
and 3 requires a performance measure where the inputs are available at the segment-level.
The only performance measure that meets this qualification is the loss ratio, where all
three inputs are recorded separately for each business line. Panel 1 of Table 2 reports
summary statistics for the performance variables and control variables for both
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diversifying and non-diversifying insurers. Mean and median ROA and UROA are not
statistically different between diversifying and non-diversifying insurers.26 Though,
diversifying firms tend to have higher loss ratios (+6% mean, +3% median) than their nondiversifying peers.

[Table 2 about here]

3.4.2 Control Variables
In our multivariate analysis, we include several control variables that reflect firmspecific and market-specific factors which prior research has shown to influence one or
more aspects of the loss ratio. One firm-specific control we include is size, Sommer (1996)
suggests that larger insurers have lower insolvency risk which allows them to charge
higher prices on insurance products. Cummins and Nini (2002) relate insurer size to
market power, therefore we would expect larger insurers to more easily generate revenue
(premiums) efficiencies following diversification activity than small insurers. Consistent
with this notion, Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) find that firm size is positively related to
firm performance. We measure size as the natural logarithm of total assets.27 We find that
diversifying insurers are 6.4% larger than non-diversifying insurers. In addition to insurer
size, we control for insurer growth as excessive levels of asset growth can indicate

The average overall ROA of 0.015 is slightly lower with other contemporary studies using earlier samples such as
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) of .02 and Elango et al. (2008) of 0.021.
27 When aggregate insurers at the group level, assets levels are inflated due to intra-group stock holdings.
Therefore, we adjust group assets downward by the total intra-group common and preferred stock holdings.
26
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excessive risk-taking on part of the insurer. Firm growth has been linked with a
nearsighted strategy to acquire market share (Klein, 1995) and is cited as one of the most
common causes of insurer failures (A. M. Best Company, 1991). We suspect that premium
growth is related to both underwriting policy (losses) and rates as the firms with high
growth may charge lower than actuarially fair prices for their insurance products which in
the long-run can lead to increased insolvency risk (Fields et al., 2012). Not surprisingly, we
find that premium growth is 7.9% higher in diversifying insurers.
We include, as another risk metric, the ratio of net premiums (net of reinsurance) to
gross premiums written (premiums written plus reinsurance assumed). This ratio is
related to the net policy risk retained by the firm (Fields et al., 2012). Non-diversifying
firms appear to retain 7.6% more policy risk than diversifying firms. We also control for
catastrophic loss exposure (CatX) which is calculated as the portion of property premiums
written in coastal states with hurricane exposure and California earthquake coverage. 28
Diversifiers in our sample have significantly more catastrophic loss exposure than nondiversifiers at 27% and 18% respectively. Organizational differences across our sample are
controlled for by including a company type dummy variable (Mutual) that takes the value
of 1 for firms organized as a mutual insurer, and zero for stock insurers. Mutual insurers
lack in agency cost controls such as the market for corporate control, shareholder
monitoring, and equity-based compensation. Thus the organizational structure of the firm
may incentivize managers to behave differently when considering business line

CatX includes property premiums written in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia plus earthquake premiums written California.
28
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diversification. Liebenberg and Sommer (2008) show that the mutual organizational form
is associated with reduced accounting profitability which we expect to affect the
denominator (premiums earned) of our dependent variable. We find that mutual insurers
make up a larger portion of the non-diversifying sample than diversifiers.
We include, as proxy for the quantity of insurance demanded, the weighted average
state-level GDP for the market area that each firm in our sample participates in. For each
firm, market area GDP (MAGDP) is calculated as:
51

𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡

(2)

𝑗=1

Where 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 represents the per capita GDP in state 𝑗, and 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the
portion of premiums written for insurer 𝑖 in state 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Gron (1994), Esho et al.
(2004), Meier (2006), and Lazar and Denuit (2012) all empirically demonstrate that
underwriting cycles, premium dynamics, and losses are linked to aggregate economic
cycles in the economy. Table 2 provides some evidence that diversifying firms are more
often in states with higher levels of GDP as the Wilcoxon sign-rank test is significant at the
5% level. Because our dataset includes firms who enter the sample at different points in
time, the stage of the underwriting cycle at which the firm is observed can potentially affect
out results, therefore we also include year dummies to capture time-dependent trends in
our dependent variables not accounted for by our continuous variables.
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Panel 2 of Table 2 compares the loss ratio differences for each of the 22 lines of
business between diversifying and non-diversifying firms.29 Testing the differences in
mean loss ratios shows that in ten lines the loss ratios differed significantly between the
two groups.30 Our empirical analysis of Hypothesis 1 centers on testing loss ratio
differences between diversifying and non-diversifying firms, however, if diversifying firms
participate at a higher rate in lines with high loss ratios, our tests could be biased due to
the natural differences that exist between the different insurance lines rather than
differences in performance. To address this issue, we first test whether the diversifying
sample is significantly participating in a different set of business lines than the nondiversifying sample. To do so, we divide our sample into diversifiers and non-diversifiers
and evaluate participation rates in our 22 lines of business in Table 3. A firm’s primary
business line is defined as the segment that constitutes the largest portion of premiums.
The primary business line for diversifying firms are based on the lines those firms
participated in the year before they diversified. The number of firms in each primary
business line for the non-diversifying group is based on the median number of nondiversifying participants throughout the sample period. The results in Table 3 show that
the primary business line participation rates tended to be very similar between diversifiers
and non-diversifiers. The average difference in participation rates between the groups is a
remarkable -0.01%. The final row of Table 3 reports the weighted average loss ratio for

Lines of business included in this study are the 24 lines reported by Berry-Stölzle et al. (2012) with the
following modifications: (1) Other liability combines “Other Liability – Occurrence” and “Other Liability –
Claims Made” (lines 17.1 and 17.2); and (2) reinsurance is not considered as a possible new line of business.
This leaves 22 lines of business.
30 Diversifier’s had higher loss ratios in: fire, farmowners, earthquake, products liability, fidelity, surety, and
burglary & theft. Non-diversifiers’ had higher loss ratios in: homeowners, financial guaranty, and auto
insurance.
29
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each group using the loss ratios from Table 2 and participation rates in Table 3 as the
weights. Again, the difference between the weighted average loss ratios is a marginal
0.02%. Furthermore, a simple correlation test of participation rates and loss ratios indicate
that no significant relationship exists between the participation rates of diversifying firms
and the loss ratios of the lines they participate in.31 Overall, these results offer compelling
evidence that diversifying firms are not systematically participating in business lines with
higher loss ratios than non-diversifying firms.

[Table 3 about here]

The Pearson correlation coefficient between diversifying-firm participation rates and the average loss ratio
per line is 0.0664 with p-value of 0.7633.
31
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3.5 Results

3.5.1 Prior Performance (H1)
We begin our empirical analysis by testing Hypothesis 1. The theoretical work of
Burch et al. (2000), Matsusaka (2001), and Gomes and Livdan (2004) suggest that firms
will seek new business as a result of poor performance. Therefore, we perform a
longitudinal analysis of overall firm performance centered at the diversification event
(t=0). Since we are interested in relative performance, we report the performance of
diversifying firms relative to their non-diversifying peers. That is, we match diversifying
firms with the group of non-diversifying firms that operate in the same primary line of
business.32
Table 4 presents mean and median differences in ROA, UROA, and loss ratio (LR) for
diversifying firms and non-diversifying firms arrayed in event-time, from three years
before through three years after the diversification event. Two results are notable. First,
diversifying firms report lower ROA and UROA in the pre-diversifying period. Median ROA
is significantly lower in years -1 and -2, and median UROA is significantly lower in years -1,
-2 and in -3. The significantly higher LR in years -2 and -3 also suggests that diversifying

If there are fewer than ten non-diversifying firms to formulate our benchmarks, we use the overall average
loss ratio of non-diversifying firms. For example, in Table 3 we report that 5 diversifying firms reported
aircraft insurance as their primary line of business, however 0 non-diversifying insurers reported the same
primary line. Therefore, we use the year-matched-average, non-diversifying firm ROA, UROA, and LR as
benchmarks. Backfilled benchmarks total 54 observations.
32
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firms are paying out more dollars in claims and underwriting expenses per dollar of earned
revenue than non-diversifying firms in the recent past, however the difference in loss ratio
is not significant in the year 𝑡 =  −1. Second, consistent with the diversification discount
literature, we observe that the performance disparity between diversifying and nondiversifying firms widens in the post-diversification period.

[Table 4 about here]

Overall, the results presented in Table 4 provide evidence supportive of Hypothesis
1, we find that diversifying firms having low relative performance in the years leading up to
diversification activity. While this result is consistent with possible value-maximizing
behavior of underperforming firms, the strong negative performance following the
diversification event suggests that managers are on average unsuccessful in their efforts to
maximize firm performance. The next set of results will help identify the source of the
negative post-diversification performance, whether the existing business lines’
performance declines, or if management is simply picking bad business lines.

3.5.2 Post-diversification performance (H2/H3)
Our findings in Table 4 confirm that diversification activity is followed by poor
performance. However, the source of the performance disparity has yet to be identified. In
this section we identify whether the existing business lines or the new business lines are
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responsible for the poor performance following diversification activity observed in Table 4.
For example, in 2004 the Plymouth Rock Insurance Group was writing business in
homeowners insurance and auto insurance, though in 2005 they added fire insurance to
their portfolio. Our research design would require us to track the loss ratio of the prediversified firm (the combined loss ratio of auto and home) and the loss ratio of the new
line, fire insurance, separately. We then can use this disaggregated data to determine which
lines, new or old, are responsible for any change in the firm’s overall performance post
diversification.
The results of our initial test of Hypothesis 2 and 3 are reported in Table 5. The “old
loss ratio” refers to the loss ratio of the collection of business lines the firm participated in
before diversifying. The “new loss ratio” refers to the loss ratio of new business lines added
in the diversification year, t=0. Two results are notable from Table 5. First, we find that
after firms diversify, the mean old loss ratio significantly increases from 58.8% to 64.2%
and remains elevated for three years following the diversification event. Median values also
confirm an increase the old loss ratio for years 0, +1, and +2, though in year +3 the median
existing business loss ratio improved to 59%. Second, the new business lines outperform
the existing lines. The new line loss ratios are lower in the diversification year, and are
significantly lower every year following diversification. This evidence suggests that the
source of the poor performance in diversifying firms is due to worsening performance in
the existing business lines rather than management selecting bad business sectors to
diversify into. In untabulated tests, we also find that the average new line loss ratio was not
significantly different than the average non-diversifier loss ratio, again verifying that the
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diversification discount is due to the performance decline in the existing segments rather
than the new segments.
[Table 5 about here]
To verify our univariate findings in Table 5, we use regression analysis to link the
declining performance in the old loss ratio with diversification activity while controlling for
several significant firm specific characteristics that have been shown to influence the loss
ratio. These results are reported in Table 6. To mirror our findings in Table 5, we sample
diversifying firms in the year before they diversify giving us 1,041 diversification events
between years 2000 and 2012. We then use the one-, two-, three-, and four-year change in
the old loss ratio as dependent variables in our OLS regressions. The model’s intercept is
the primary variable of interest as it can verify that the change in the old loss ratio is
significantly different from zero, holding all else constant. The control variables include
firm size, asset growth, catastrophic exposure, the ratio of net premiums written to gross
premiums written, market area GDP, company type, and finally year fixed effects. The basic
model is as follows:

𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝑊/𝐺𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡

(3)

+ 𝑀𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .

[Table 6 about here]
The results in Table 6 substantiate the univariate findings of Table 5 that the prediversified firm’s loss ratio significantly increases following a diversification event. The
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constant in each model is positive and significant, evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. This
finding is consistent with the idea that adding a new division inside the firm gives
managers opportunity to poorly allocate human or financial resources across divisions.
This also advances the view that resource misallocation is responsible for the poor postdiversification performance common in the extant literature. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first empirical examination of the effect diversification has on the future success
of the existing business lines. The coefficient on size was the only explanatory variable that
remained significant in every model. Firm size is negatively and significantly related to the
change in old loss ratio, suggesting that larger firms are better suited to experience positive
performance effects following diversification than smaller firms. This result is consistent
with Cummins and Nini (2002), Liebenberg and Sommer (2008), and Elango et al. (2008).
3.5.3 Robustness
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) use an alternative
diversification measure, the number of business segments, to validate whether
diversification is associated with poor equity performance. As robustness, we perform two
similar regression analyses here, first we link the change in the existing business loss ratio
with the change in the number of business lines they participate in, and second we regress
the loss ratio on the total number of business lines the firm participates in. The new
independent variables, the change in the number of business lines and total number of
business lines, are not unique to diversifying firms therefore we include both diversifying
and non-diversifying observations in our analysis to show the average effect additional
business lines have on performance for all firms. Panel A of Table 7 reports that 186 non-

121

diversifier observations drop between 1 and 16 lines during in a sample year. Diversifying
firms were much more active during our sample, where 1,415 diversifiers dropped as
many as 13 lines or added up to 12 lines in a one year period. In Table 7 we model the
change in old loss ratio with Equation (3) and add the change in the number of business
lines (Δ Lines) as a new explanatory variable. Table 8 is our second robustness test where
the overall loss ratio is also modeled with Equation (3) and we add a variable, Lines Total,
which represents the total number of business lines each firm participates in during that
year. Because we are now using pooled cross-sectional data, we use general least squares
(GLS) random-effects models to test the causal relation between diversification activity and
performance.33 GLS models can correct for the presence of serial autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity which are common issues in pooled time series data (Kmenta, 1986;
Mansi and Reeb, 2002).
[Table 7 about here]
[Table 8 about here]
Table 7 shows that adding an additional business line is associated with declining
performance for up to the next three years, Δ Lines is positive and significant in every
model. The variable NPW/GPW is also positive and significant in every model, indicating
that firms that retain more policy risk in the current year experience higher loss ratios in
future years. Table 8 reports similar results, Lines Total is positive and significant and of
equal magnitude in both the full sample model and the diversifier only model, again

The result of the Hausman test (P>chi2 = 0.2944) indicates that random effects models produce more
efficient estimators than fixed effects. Further testing for the presence of random-effects also confirm the use
of random effects over OLS estimates (see LM statistic in Table 7).
33
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verifying that additional business lines decrease the overall performance of a firm. Though
the findings of Table 7 and Table 8 lack the ability to uncover the source of the
performance decline in these firms, they are consistent with the diversification discount
literature of Lang and Stultz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Laeven and Levine (2007),
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008), Berger et al. (2010), Ammann et al. (2012), and Hoechle et
al. (2012).
One potential explanation of the primary finding in our paper is that diversifying
firms could have downward trending loss ratios in the years prior to diversifying which
persist after the diversification event. Therefore we test for the presence of a downward
performance trend using a specification similar to models presented in Powell, Hoyt, and
Mustard (2006)34:

𝑂𝑙𝑑𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑁𝑃𝑊/𝐺𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑡
(4)
+ 𝑀𝐴𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .

Where 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 measures the distance in years each observation is from the
diversification event, and 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 measures the distance each observation is in years
following the diversification event.35 The estimates on “Before” and “After” are easy to
interpret – positive estimates would indicate that the old loss ratio was increasing
(worsening) before or after the diversification event, while negative estimates would

Other papers that have used similar techniques to evaluate the before/after impact of specific treatments
include Lott (1998), Mustard (2001), Plassman and Whitely (2003), and Grinols and Mustard (2006).
35 For example, if a firm diversified in 2008, the before variable for 2008 = 0, 2007 = -1, 2006 = -2, 2005 = -3,
etc. The after variable for the firm in 2008 = 0, 2009 = 1, 2010 = 2, 2011 = 3, etc.
34
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indicate that the old loss ratio was decreasing (improving) before or after the
diversification event. If diversifying firms are experiencing downward trending
performance before diversifying, then we would expect to see the Before variable positive
and significant. However, the results of Table 9 show just the opposite, after controlling for
determinants of the loss ratio, there appears to be no trend in the existing business loss
ratio in the years prior to diversification. The coefficient on Before in each model fails to
show any significance. Model 2 also shows that after diversifying, the old loss ratio actually
improves during that period as the coefficient on After is negative and significant. This
result is also supported in the univariate findings, where the median old loss ratio
gradually improves following a diversification event.
[Table 9 about here]
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3.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the source of the diversification discount.
We examine three potential sources of the discount namely, firm performance in the prediversification period, existing segment performance in the post-diversification period, and
the performance of the newly acquired business lines. Prior research have been unable to
identify the performance of the separate lines due to the lack of segment-level performance
data from COMPUSTAT.
Using a sample of U.S. property casualty insurers with performance data available at
the business segment level, we find some evidence that diversifying firms underperform
peer firms that do not diversify in the three years before the diversification event. Median
ROA and UROA of diversifying firms were ranked significantly lower than non-diversifying
firms in univariate tests. This finding is consistent with theories suggesting that
diversification activity can be the result of dynamic value-maximizing behavior of
underperforming firms. However, in the year firms diversify the performance disparity
dramatically widens. Both means and medians of all our performance variables prove to be
significantly worse in the three subsequent years for diversifying firms than for nondiversifiers, consistent with the idea that diversification itself destroys value. Next we
disaggregate the diversifying firms into two parts, one part comprising of the existing
business lines the firm participated in before they diversified, and one part comprising of
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the new business lines. We track the loss ratios of each part to identify the source of the
poor performance in the post diversification period. We find that the existing business loss
ratio increases by 5.4% in the year firms diversify, and is consistently higher for the next 3
years. Our multivariate analysis confirms that diversifiers experience significant
performance declines in the post-diversification period. This finding is consistent with the
research that links the diversification discount with poor resource allocation in
conglomerate firms, adding a new business line should have no direct impact on the
existing business segments unless the corporate focus and resources are being siphoned
from those units. We also find that the new lines are considerably more profitable than the
existing business lines (the loss ratio averages 6% lower in the post-diversification period),
a finding inconsistent with the idea that managers are diversifying into underperforming
sectors (agency theory).
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Table 3.1 Prior Literature
Panel A – The Diversification Discount/Premium
Author
Database

Primary findings

Inter-industry studies
Lang and Stulz (1994)
Berger and Ofek (1995)

Segment file
Segment file

Servaes (1996)

Segment file

Lamont and Polk (2002)

Segment file

Villalonga (2004b)

BITS

Santalo and Becerra (2008)

Segment file

Tobin’s Q and diversification is negatively related
Diversified firms trade at a 15% discount to their
imputed value.
Diversified firms traded at a discount during the
1960’s and 70’s.
Changes in firm investment diversity is negatively
related to changes in excess value.
Diversified firms trade at a significant premium
compared to single-segment firms
Find both premiums and discounts for diversified
firms depending on the industry of the firm.

Intra-industry studies
Hoyt and Trieschmann (1991)
Tombs and Hoyt (1994)

NAIC
NAIC

Elango, Ma, Pope (2008)
Liebenberg and Sommer (2008)

NAIC
NAIC

Find higher average returns for focused insurers
Find a negative relation between diversification
and stock returns.
ROA and ROE are lower for diversified firms
ROA and ROE are lower for diversified firms

Panel B – Explaining the Discount
Resource Misallocation
Lamont (1997)
Shin and Stulz (1998)
Scharfstein (1998)
Rajan et al. (2000)
Mitton (2012)

He observed that oil firms decrease their
investment in non-oil segments following
decreases in oil revenues.
Show that investments made by one segment of a
diversified firm are dependent on the cash flows of
the other segments.
Diversified firms invest too much in low-q
divisions.
Model the inefficiencies of ICMs and find
empirical support consistent with their model.
The misallocation of capital is primarily
responsible for the inefficiencies in diversified
firms.
Agency Cost

Roll (1986)
Jensen (1986)

Hubris on the part of the decision maker can lead
to overpayment during acquisitions.
Self-interested managers will use free cash flows to
acquire poor investments to increase their own
power, prestige, or compensation.
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Jensen and Murphy (1990)
Amihud and Lev (1981)
Shleifer and Vishny (1989)
Hyland and Diltz (2002)

Managers will diversify to increase their own
compensation.
Managers diversify the firm because they cannot
diversify their own portfolios.
Managers entrench themselves by becoming
specialists of diversified business divisions.
Manager compensation increases following
diversification activity.
No Discount/Other Explanations

Campa and Kedia (1999)
Graham et al. (2002)
Campa and Kedia (2002)
Villalonga (2004a)
Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010)
Hund, Monk, and Tice (2011)

Conglomerates are different from single-segment
firms. After controlling for these differences, the
discount drops all together.
Newly acquired segments were trading at a
discount before the acquisition.
Firms self-select into diversification. After
controlling for the endogenous choice, the
diversification discount disappears.
Also finds that the discount disappears following
controls for endogeneity.
Find the diversification discount is an artifact of
uncertainty in growth rates of diversified firms.
Modify the excess value approach to evaluate
diversified firms. They find that diversified firms
trade at a premium compared to similar focused
firms.
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Table 3.2 – Summary Statistics
Sample period is 2000 – 2012. ROA is the ratio of net income to assets. UROA represents underwriting
return on assets which is the ratio of underwriting profits to assets. Loss ratio is computed as:
(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)⁄𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 . Size is the natural log of assets. Growth is the oneyear percent growth in premiums.
Panel 1 – Summary statistics
Means

Medians

NonDiversifiers

Diversifiers

T-test

NonDiversifie
r

0.0100

0.0105

0.27

0.0150

0.0147

0.06

-0.0190

-0.0186

0.17

-0.0122

-0.0138

0.72

0.5404

0.6033

4.69***

0.6168

0.6470

3.34***

17.1118

18.2093

10.52***

16.9776

17.9787

9.54***

Growth

0.0246

0.1031

6.70***

0.0476

0.0881

8.05***

NPW/GPW

0.7158

0.6404

6.52***

0.7572

0.6608

7.89***

CatX

0.1794

0.2700

5.78***

0.0000

0.1315

11.28***

Mutual

0.3349

0.2505

3.86***

0.0000

3.22***

41,579
Market GDP
Panel 2 – Loss Ratio (LR) by business line

41,724

0.41

Variable
ROA
UROA
Loss Ratio (LR)
Size

Line of Business

N_

Non-Diversifiers
Median
Mean LR
LR

Diversifier

0.0000
40,879

Wilcoxon
Approx. Z

41,682

2.11**

Diversifiers
N_

Mean LR

Median
LR

Diff

T-test

Wilcoxon
Approx. Z

Fire & Allied Lines

401

57.7%

57.5%

446

60.7%

60.3%

-0.030

1.72*

1.44

Farmowners

150

63.3%

65.4%

161

68.5%

67.2%

-0.051

1.91*

1.71*

Homeowners

312

73.8%

72.8%

378

70.0%

70.9%

0.038

2.38**

2.77***

6

42.1%

40.9%

21

41.5%

54.0%

0.006

0.04

0.41

Ocean Marine

52

62.2%

60.6%

131

68.5%

72.3%

-0.063

1.28

1.57

Inland Marine

285

41.6%

39.2%

415

44.4%

43.0%

-0.028

1.36

1.94*

Financial Guaranty

15

62.5%

57.4%

29

37.9%

28.9%

0.246

2.00**

2.09*

Medical Malpractice

118

70.3%

67.7%

114

75.1%

75.2%

-0.048

1.29

1.58

Earthquake

96

11.3%

0.4%

179

18.9%

4.3%

-0.075

2.19**

3.01***

Accident & Health
Workers
Compensation

85

65.5%

69.1%

165

64.8%

69.7%

0.007

0.16

0.23

264

77.0%

75.8%

284

78.2%

80.0%

-0.011

0.55

1.66*

Products Liability

92

55.1%

53.5%

188

63.6%

65.1%

-0.085

1.82*

1.84*

Aircraft

16

84.4%

95.0%

79

85.1%

87.8%

-0.007

0.09

0.07

Fidelity

76

33.0%

27.4%

152

46.1%

44.8%

-0.132

2.74***

2.89***

Surety

154

33.6%

21.9%

231

40.2%

35.4%

-0.066

1.82*

2.60***

Burglary & Theft

107

29.9%

25.0%

185

44.8%

43.4%

-0.149

3.80***

3.58***

Boiler & Machinery

40

45.2%

38.9%

136

45.3%

39.5%

-0.001

0.02

0.08

Credit

17

51.0%

56.9%

99

48.2%

48.6%

0.028

0.31

0.47

International

7

59.3%

70.1%

40

80.3%

85.3%

-0.210

1.62

1.56

Auto
Commercial Multiperil

382

74.7%

73.0%

436

71.5%

72.5%

0.032

2.37**

1.96**

242

63.4%

63.5%

362

66.6%

67.8%

-0.032

1.54

1.98**

Other Liability

420

57.0%

55.4%

510

60.1%

62.1%

-0.031

1.58

2.27**

Mortgage Guaranty
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Table 3.3: Composition of primary business lines for diversifying and non-diversifying
firms.
Sample years are 2000-2012.Afirm’sprimarybusinesslineisthebusinesslinethat
represents the largest portion of total premiums written in a given year. The sample of
diversifier firm years (n = 1,081) are sampled the year prior to diversification activity.
The non-diversifyingsample’sparticipationrates(n=970)arethemediannumberof
participants each year participating in the various lines. The weighted average loss
ratio combines the industry loss ratios reported in Table 2 with the reported
participation as the weights.
NonDiversifiers
Difference
Diversifiers
Primary Line of
n
%
n
%
%
Business
84
8.7%
77
7.1%
1.5%
Fire
8
0.8%
10
0.9%
-0.1%
Farmowners
116 12.0%
136 12.6%
-0.6%
Homeowners
4
0.4%
3
0.3%
0.1%
Mortgage Guaranty
5
0.5%
7
0.7%
-0.1%
Ocean Marine
16
1.7%
20
1.9%
-0.2%
Inland Marine
11
1.1%
0
0.0%
1.1%
Financial Guaranty
109 11.2%
38
3.5%
7.7%
Medical Malpractice
1
0.1%
4
0.4%
-0.3%
Earthquake
34
3.5%
27
2.5%
1.0%
Accident & Health
128
116 10.7%
2.5%
Workers
13.2%
Compensation
3
0.3%
3
0.3%
0.0%
Products Liability
0
0.0%
5
0.5%
-0.5%
Aircraft
1
0.1%
1
0.1%
0.0%
Fidelity
61
6.3%
33
3.1%
3.2%
Surety
1
0.1%
5
0.5%
-0.4%
Burglary & Theft
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0.0%
Boiler & Machinery
4
0.4%
13
1.2%
-0.8%
Credit
1
0.1%
3
0.3%
-0.2%
International
264 27.2%
315 29.1%
-1.9%
Auto
48
92
8.5%
-3.6%
Commercial Multi5.0%
peril
71
7.3%
173 16.0%
-8.7%
Other Liability
Weighted Average
Loss Ratio

66.85%

66.83%
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0.02%

Table 3.4:Diversifyingfirms’peer-adjusted performance before and after diversification events

Notes: Longitudinal study of firms diversifying at time t. Mean and median differences between diversifying

and non-diversifying firms are reported for return on assets (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ⁄𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ), underwriting return on
assets
(𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ⁄𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ),
and
total
loss
ratio
(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)⁄𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 . All ratios are winsorized at the 5th and 95%
percentile. T-statistics are reported in parentheses for means, Wilcoxon-sum rank score p-values are
reported in parentheses for medians. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
t

-3

-2

ROA

ROA

UROA

UROA

LR

LR

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

0.0004

-0.0017

-0.0016

-0.0024*

(0.25)

(0.1685)

-0.0019

-0.0011**

(-1.21)
-1

-0.0021
(-1.41)

0

-0.0062***
(-4.44)

+1

-0.0044***
(-3.01)

+2

-0.0033**
(-2.18)

+3

-0.0033**
(-2.00)

(0.0221)
-0.0018**
(0.0119)
-0.0053***
(0.0001)
-0.0048***
(0.0001)
-0.0026***
(0.0012)
-0.0026***
(0.0012)

(-0.73)
-0.0031
(-1.61)
-0.0019
(-1.12)
-0.0081***
(-4.71)
-0.0055***
(-3.03)
-0.0033*
(-1.75)
-0.0064***
(-3.12)
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(0.0582)
-0.0027***
(0.0064)
-0.0014***
(0.0050)
-0.0052***
(0.0050)
-0.0046***
(0.0001)
-0.0008***
(0.0052)
-0.0052***
(0.0001)

0.0238***
(2.63)
0.0180**
(2.17)
0.0019
(0.24)
0.0137*
(1.86)
0.0276***
(3.55)
0.0155**
(2.06)
0.0223***
(2.69)

0.0025*
(0.0694)
0.0001
(0.1444)
0.0001
(0.3545)
0.0055*
(0.0854)
0.0117***
(0.0017)
0.0047*
(0.0882)
0.0165***
(0.0021)

Table 3.5: Old and new business loss ratios following a diversification event
Sample: diversifying firms for years 2000 – 2012. Firms diversify in year t=0. The business lines firms participated
inbeforetheydiversified(t=0)areconsidered“old”,andthebusinesslinesthefirmsdiversifyintoare“new”.The
loss ratio is computed as (𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)⁄𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 .
(1)
T-test

(2)
T-test

(3)
Wilcoxon

(4)
Wilcoxon

Old LR t - Old LR t=-

Old LR t - New LR

P(Old t=-1 < Old t)

P(Old t > New t)

1

t

Mean

Median

Old Loss Ratio t=-1

0.588

0.628

Old Loss Ratio t=0

0.642

0.654

(4.81)

(<.0001)

Old Loss Ratio t=+1

0.643

0.662

(4.94)

(<.0001)

Old Loss Ratio t=+2

0.622

0.650

(3.02)

(0.0482)

Old Loss Ratio t=+3

0.623

0.590

(2.62)

(0.0694)

New Loss Ratio t=0

0.572

0.604

(6.60)

(<.0001)

New Loss Ratio t=+1

0.557

0.600

(8.06)

(<.0001)

New Loss Ratio t=+2

0.563

0.603

(5.38)

(<.0001)

New Loss Ratio t=+3

0.568

0.590

(4.76)

(<.0001)
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Table 3.6:Multivariateanalysisofthechangeintheexistingbusinesslines’lossratioafteradiversification
event
Sample period is 2000 to 2012. The dependent variables are the change in loss ratio of the group of business
lines the firm held the year before it diversified (Old LR). The loss ratio is computed as:
(𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)⁄𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 . Size is the natural log of assets. Growth is the oneyear percent growth in premiums. NPW/GPW is the ratio of net premiums (net of reinsurance) to gross
premiums written. CatX represents the firm’s catastrophic exposure which is the percent of property
premiums written in coastal states vulnerable to hurricanes. Mutual = 1 if the firm is organized as a mutual,
= 0 otherwise. Market GDP represents the weighted average per capita GDP based on the states the firm
does business in. OLS standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and
p<0.10 respectively.

VARIABLES
Constant
Size
Growth
CatX
NPW/GPW
Market GDP
Mutual

Year Fixed Effects

𝐷𝑉 = 𝐿𝑅𝑡=0
− 𝐿𝑅𝑡=−1

𝐷𝑉 = 𝐿𝑅𝑡=1
− 𝐿𝑅𝑡=−1

0.334***

0.292***

𝐷𝑉 = 𝐿𝑅𝑡=2
− 𝐿𝑅𝑡=−1
0.237*

𝐷𝑉 = 𝐿𝑅𝑡=3
− 𝐿𝑅𝑡=−1
0.265**

(0.101)

(0.109)

(0.122)

(0.134)

-0.016***

-0.016***

-0.015***

-0.017***

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

-0.091***

-0.025

-0.009

-0.061

(0.028)

(0.031)

(0.034)

(0.039)

-0.046

-0.050

-0.049

-0.040

(0.028)

(0.031)

(0.034)

(0.039)

-0.034

-0.017

0.037

-0.045

(0.035)

(0.038)

(0.042)

(0.047)

0.013

0.021

0.013

0.031

(0.017)

(0.018)

(0.020)

(0.021)

-0.037*

-0.034

-0.023

-0.014

(0.020)

(0.022)

(0.024)

(0.026)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

1,041

898

765

651

R2

0.057

0.063

0.090

0.114
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Table 3.7: Change in the number of business lines
Sample represents the years 2000 to 2012 and include all available firm years. The dependent variables are
the change in loss ratio of the group of business lines the firm held the year before it diversified (Old LR).
Loss ratio is computed as: (𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)⁄𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 . Δ Lines represents the
number of business lines added that year. Size is the natural log of assets. Growth is the one-year percent
growth in premiums. NPW/GPW is the ratio of net premiums (net of reinsurance) to gross premiums
written.CatXrepresentsthefirm’scatastrophicexposurewhichisthepercentofpropertypremiumswritten
in coastal states vulnerable to hurricanes. Mutual = 1 if the firm is organized as a mutual, = 0 otherwise.
Market GDP represents the weighted average per capita GDP based on the states the firm does business in.
All specifications use random effects estimators, standard errors in parenthesis. L.M. P-value is the result of
the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects for each model. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10 respectively.
Panel A: Number of observations that report a change in the number of business lines
Non-Diversifiers
ΔLines≤-1
n = 186
ΔLines≥1
n=0
Min = -16
Max = 0

Diversifiers
ΔLines≤-1
n = 590
ΔLines≥1
n = 825
Min = -13
Max = 12

Panel B: Multivariate analysis
VARIABLES
Constant
ΔLines
Size
Growth
CatX
NPW/GPW
Market GDP
Mutual
Year fixed effects
Observations
Pseudo R2
L.M. P-value

𝐷𝑉 = 𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑡
-0.026
(0.023)
0.011***
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
0.010
(0.008)
0.009
(0.007)
0.028***
(0.009)
0.00002
(0.003)
0.00001
(0.005)
Yes
10,687
0.0147
<.0001
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𝐷𝑉 = 𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑡+2 − 𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑡

𝐷𝑉 = 𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑡+3 − 𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑡

-0.054
(0.035)
0.013***
(0.003)
0.0004
(0.002)
0.016
(0.010)
0.022**
(0.010)
0.055***
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.005
(0.007)
Yes

-0.136***
(0.049)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.002
(0.002)
0.037***
(0.012)
0.011
(0.014)
0.082***
(0.017)
0.003
(0.006)
0.011
(0.010)
Yes

9,290
0.0264
<.0001

8,027
0.0424
<.0001

Table 3.8: Total business lines
Sample represents the years 2000 to 2012 and include all available firm years. The dependent
variables are the loss ratio and old loss ratio which for diversifiers is the group of business lines the
firm held the year before it diversified, for non-diversifiers it is simply their loss ratio. Loss ratio is
computed as: (𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)⁄𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 . Lines represents the number of
business lines the firm participated in that year. Size is the natural log of assets. Growth is the oneyear percent growth in premiums. NPW/GPW is the ratio of net premiums (net of reinsurance) to
gross premiums written. CatX represents the firm’s catastrophic exposure which is the percent of
property premiums written in coastal states vulnerable to hurricanes. Mutual = 1 if the firm is
organized as a mutual, = 0 otherwise. Market GDP represents the weighted average per capita GDP
based on the states the firm does business in. All specifications use random effects estimators,
standard errors in parenthesis. L.M. P-value is the result of the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
multiplier test for random effects for each model. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **,
* represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10 respectively.
Full Sample
DV=Loss Ratio

Diversifiers Only
DV=Loss Ratio

Year fixed effects

0.192***
(0.049)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.028***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.007)
0.023*
(0.013)
-0.081***
(0.013)
-0.009
(0.006)
0.041***
(0.010)
0.192***
(0.049)
Yes

0.368***
(0.069)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.023***
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.010)
0.016
(0.017)
-0.067***
(0.017)
-0.031***
(0.009)
0.036***
(0.013)
0.368***
(0.069)
Yes

Observations
Pseudo R2
L.M. P-value

12,711
0.1083
<.0001

6,041
0.0899
<.0001

VARIABLES
Constant
Lines Total
Size
Growth
CatX
NPW/GPW
Market GDP
Mutual
Constant
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Table 3.9: Trends Analysis
Using the Hoyt, Mustard, and Powell (2006) trend analysis method. Two new variables are created that
represent the trend in the dependent variable before and after the event (diversification into a new line). The
new variables count the distance from the event in years. For example, if Firm X diversified in 2008, the before
variable for 2008 = 0, 2007 = -1, 2006 = -2, 2005 = -3, etc. The after variable for Firm X in 2008 = 0, 2009 =
1, 2010 = 2, 2011 = 3, etc. F-test is used to determine the difference between Before and After (H0: Before =
After). The dependent variable is the old loss ratio for diversifiers or the overall loss ratio for non-diversifiers.
Loss ratio is computed as: (𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)⁄𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 . Size is the natural log of
assets. Growth is the one-year percent growth in premiums. NPW/GPW is the ratio of net premiums (net of
reinsurance) to gross premiums written. CatX represents the firm’s catastrophic exposure which is the
percent of property premiums written in coastal states vulnerable to hurricanes. Mutual = 1 if the firm is
organized as a mutual, = 0 otherwise. Market GDP represents the weighted average per capita GDP based on
the states the firm does business in. Model 1 coefficients are based on OLS estimators, Model 2 coefficients
are based on random effects estimators, standard errors in parenthesis. L.M. P-value is the result of the
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects for each model. Standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10 respectively.

VARIABLES
Constant
Before
After
Size
Growth
CatX
NPW/GPW
Market GDP
Mutual
Year Fixed Effects

OLS
DV=Old LR

GLS-RE
DV=Old LR

0.2368***
(0.0349)
0.0006
(0.0017)
-0.0012
(0.0012)
0.0304***
(0.0014)
-0.0157
(0.0198)
0.0314***
(0.0095)
-0.1234***
(0.0133)
-0.0172***
(0.0053)
0.0648***
(0.0069)
Yes

0.1618**
(0.0646)
-0.0020
(0.0018)
-0.0034***
(0.0013)
0.0392***
(0.0029)
0.0005
(0.0173)
0.1004***
(0.0165)
-0.1075***
(0.0167)
-0.0432***
(0.0088)
0.0451***
(0.0131)
Yes

F-statistic for difference in
Before and After

0.58

0.44

Probability >F

0.4481

0.5065

Observations
R-squared
LM Statistic

6,218
0.1360

6,218
0.1268
<.0001
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